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INTRODUCTION 
State occupational licensing laws have generated an unex-
pected legal fallout.  Although enacted to provide state control 
over professions,1 the licensing laws have become the legal bases 
for a wide variety of claims that bear a striking resemblance to 
trademark infringement actions.  The issues raised by such claims 
range from First Amendment concerns to questions regarding evi-
dentiary standards. 
The individual states regulate and license more than eight hun-
 
1. See 15 AM. JUR. 2D Occupations, Trades, and Professions § 2 (1989).  Regulation 
of occupations falls within the states’ traditional police powers: 
Reasonable regulation of a business is within the state’s police power when it 
is in the interest of protecting public health or safety. . . . Municipal corpora-
tions may . . . regulate any trade, occupation, calling, or business the unre-
strained pursuit of which might affect injuriously the public health, morals, 
safety, comfort, or welfare, or might result in fraud or imposition on the public. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
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dred occupations (“licensed practices”).2  Those licensed practices 
range from familiar occupations, such as physician,3 pharmacist,4 
real estate agent,5 and plumber,6 to obscure pursuits, such as horse-
shoer,7 egg handler,8 and lightning-rod installer.9  The common li-
censed practices, such as medicine and engineering, are regulated 
in all fifty states.  The need for professional regulation and state 
licensure arises from the potential for public harm presented by the 
incompetent practices of individuals within certain vocations.10 
Many states regulate licensed practices by enacting statutes 
containing title laws, which prohibit unlicensed persons from using 
certain words and derivatives of those words, titles, and designa-
tions (“words, titles, and designations”) in a manner that may lead 
a reasonable person to believe that the user is entitled to engage in 
the licensed practice.11  For example, title laws may prohibit per-
 
2. See BENJAMIN SHIMBERG, OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING:  A PUBLIC PERSPECTIVE 15 
(Educational Testing Serv. 1982) [hereinafter SHIMBERG, OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING]. 
3. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 20-9 (LEXIS through 1995-96 Sess.) (requiring a 
license to “diagnose, treat, operate for, or prescribe for any injury, deformity, ailment or 
disease, actual or imaginary, of another person” for “compensation, gain or reward”). 
4. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 32-1922 (Michie, LEXIS through 1997 1st Reg. & 
Spec. Sess.) (setting forth qualification and licensure requirements for pharmacists). 
5. See, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 10130 (Deering, LEXIS through 1997 Sess.) 
(making it unlawful to act or advertise as a real estate broker or salesman unless licensed 
by the state). 
6. See, e.g., ARK. CODE. ANN. § 17-38-301 (West, WESTLAW through 1997 Reg. 
Sess.) (requiring a license to “engage in work as a master plumber, journeyman plumber, 
[or] apprentice plumber”). 
7. See, e.g., MONT. ADMIN. R. 8.22.708 (1997) (governing occupational licenses for 
farriers, shoers, and blacksmiths). 
8. See, e.g., GA. CODE. ANN. § 26-2-263 (LEXIS through 1997 Sess.) (requiring a 
license to engage in business as an egg handler). 
9. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 40-41-60 (West, WESTLAW though 1997 Reg. 
Sess.) (prohibiting commercial installation of lightening rods without a license). 
10. See 15 AM. JUR. 2D Occupations, Trades, and Professions § 2 (1989); see also 
Mitch Altschuler, The Dental Health Care Professionals Nonresidence Licensing Act:  
Will it Effectuate the Final Decay of State Discrimination of Out-of-State Dentists?, 26 
RUT. L.J. 187, 194 (1994) (discussing potential for harm to the public by incompetent 
dental and medical persons).  But see Elizabeth Harrison Hadley, Nurses and Prescrip-
tive Authority:  A Legal and Economic Analysis, 15 AM. J.L. MED. 245, 292-98 (1989) 
(arguing that current licensure laws provide little protection to the public because the 
laws fail to differentiate between the “unauthorized practice of a profession” and “in-
competent practice”). 
11. See SHIMBERG, OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING, supra note 2. 
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sons not licensed to practice medicine from using the title of “phy-
sician,” “medical doctor,” or the designation “M.D.”12  Similarly, 
title laws may restrict the use of the designation “C.P.A.” to indi-
viduals who are certified public accountants,13 and may restrict the 
use of the title “professional engineer,” or the designation “P.E.”, 
or the word “engineer” and its derivatives, to those persons li-
censed to practice engineering.14 
Developments in technology may pose, and in some cases have 
already created, significant economic threats to existing licensees.  
Those advancements have led to an increase in new professions 
and specialties and to the expansion of forums and vehicles for the 
dissemination of advertising.  A licensee who believes that an unli-
censed individual has infringed upon his vocation can choose 
among several courses of action.  At the state level, the licensee 
can file a complaint with the local regulatory board or agency.15  
Reliance on state regulatory action, however, may not be the most 
advantageous avenue of pursuit—particularly if the licensee has 
suffered or believes he will suffer an economic loss due to the vio-
lation.  In a state agency action, the licensee’s recourse is usually 
limited to an injunction against the violator.  Consequently, any 
monetary recovery from a civil or criminal penalty16 inures to the 
 
12. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-422 (1994) (requiring the designation of a de-
gree in advertisements using the terms “Doctor” or “Dr.”). 
13. See, e.g., TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 41a-1 (West 1997) (requiring mini-
mum educational and experiential standards for licensure in accounting); see also Ful-
cher v. Texas State Bd. Of Pub. Accountancy, 571 S.W.2d 366 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978) 
(restricting the defendant from using the words “public accounting officers,” “accounting 
officer,” “accountant,” or any other similar abbreviation or derivation because the defen-
dant’s use of these terms had mislead the public into believing that he was an accounting 
expert). 
14. See, e.g., N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 7202 (McKinney) (West, WESTLAW through 
1997 Sess.) (“Only a person licensed or otherwise authorized under this article shall prac-
tice engineering or use the title ‘professional engineer.’”); see also Reid v. Ambach, 424 
N.Y.S.2d 793 (App. Div. 1980) (holding that a land surveyor’s use of the designation 
“civil engineers” in his firm name constituted unprofessional conduct, as well as a mis-
leading and deceptive advertising technique). 
15. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 455.225 (West 1991); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 214.10 (West 
1992); NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-168.01 (1996). 
16. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16240 (West 1997).  Under the California title 
law: 
Every person who practices, offers to practice, or advertises any business, 
trade, profession, occupation, or calling, or who uses any title, sign initials, 
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benefit of the state. Thus, the licensee may consider seeking re-
dress for any actual or potential economic injury caused by a viola-
tor through claims for false advertising and false association under 
the Trademark Act of 1946 (“Lanham Act,” the “Act”).17  In addi-
tion, a licensee may pursue claims for deceptive trade practices 
under the applicable state statutes.18  Finally, a licensee may bring 
a private cause of action under a title law.19 
This Article provides an overview of potential claims that li-
censees may pursue against individuals who violate the title laws.  
Part I focuses on the provisions for private rights of action in title 
laws and the accompanying constitutional commercial free-speech 
issues.  Part II evaluates claims for false advertising and false as-
sociation under the Lanham Act, including recovery for actual 
damages and various other remedies available to injured licensees.  
Part III considers claims under state deceptive trade practices acts.  
Part IV examines the strengths and weaknesses of potential de-
fenses to title law claims, including trademark registration, pre-
emption, and additional commercial free-speech issues.  This Arti-
cle concludes that licensed professionals must employ their private 
rights of action to protect the words, titles, and designations asso-
ciated with their professions because state enforcement is inade-
 
card, or device to indicate that he or she is qualified to practice any business, 
trade, profession, occupation, or calling for which a license, registration, or cer-
tificate is required by any law of this state, without holding a current valid li-
cense, registration, or certificate as prescribed by law is guilty of a misde-
meanor. 
Id.; see also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 455.227 (West 1991) (imposing sanctions for aiding, em-
ploying, or advising any unlicensed person in the practice of a licensed profession). 
17. Trademark Act of 1946 (“Lanham Act”), ch. 540, 60 Stat. 427 (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1051-1127 (West 1998 & Supp. 1998)).  Section 43(a) of the 
Lanham Act protects against false designations of origin, false or misleading description 
of fact, and false or misleading misrepresentations of fact that are likely to cause confu-
sion as to the source or nature of goods, services, or commercial activities.  15 U.S.C.A. 
§ 1125(a) (West 1998). 
18. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2532 (1993); D.C. CODE ANN. § 28-3904 (1981); 
FLA. STAT. ANN § 501.201 (West 1991); N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 349 (McKinney 1988); 
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 201-1 (West 1993). 
19. See infra notes 28-29 and accompanying text. 
This Article is limited to a discussion of claims arising out of the use of words, ti-
tles, and designations regulated by title laws and ignores claims, such as those for unfair 
competition, arising out of other advertising or business practices. 
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quate. 
I. OCCUPATIONAL TITLE LAWS 
Delaware, like most states, has a variety of title laws governing 
occupations.20  For example, Delaware’s engineering law requires 
engineering corporations and partnerships to obtain certificates of 
authorization to use the designations “engineer,” “engineering,” or 
any derivative of those words.21  Furthermore, non-authorized enti-
ties are forbidden from holding themselves out in a way that may 
lead the public to believe that the entity is permitted to engage in 
engineering activities.22 
Delaware’s medical title law applies similar prohibitions to the 
practice of medicine, forbidding any unlicensed person from hold-
ing himself out as a licensed medical practitioner or engaging in 
the use of words or letters that imply that he is authorized to prac-
 
20. Because Delaware is the “preeminent state in corporation law,” it has become a 
forum of choice for intellectual property litigation, hence it serves as an excellent model 
for discussion of title law actions.  Leo Herzel & Laura D. Richman, Foreword to R. 
FRANKLIN BALOTTI & JESSE A. FINKELSTEIN, THE DEL. LAW OF CORPS. & BUS. ORGS. F-1 
(2d ed. Supp. 1997)  (noting that more than half of the Fortune 500 companies are incor-
porated in Delaware, and that, between 1981 and 1984 alone, more than 40 publicly 
owned corporations reincorporated in Delaware).  In recent years, the United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of Delaware has become a primary forum for intellectual prop-
erty litigation.  See Victoria Slind-Flor, Del. Judge on IP’s Frontline, NAT’L L.J., Sept. 
15, 1997, at A1, A22 (noting that Delaware’s United States District Court is “the pre-
mium patent court in the United States”) (quoting Harold F. Wegner, professor, George 
Washington University School of Law). 
21. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 2825 (1997). 
22. The Delaware title law for engineering states in part: 
Persons or engineering corporations or partnerships not registered or holding a 
permit or certificate of authorization may not: 
(1) Practice engineering as defined in this chapter; 
(2) Use any name, title, description or designation, either orally or in writ-
ing, that will lead to the belief that such person is entitled to practice engi-
neering as defined in this chapter, including without limitation the words 
“engineer” or “engineering” or any modification or derivative of those 
words; 
(3) Advertise or hold oneself or conduct oneself in any way or in any such 
manner as to lead to the belief that such person is entitled to practice engi-
neering. 
Id. 
REED.TYP 9/29/2006  4:47 PM 
1997] CLAIMS UNDER PROFESSIONAL LICENSURE LAWS 229 
tice medicine.23  Similar to Delaware’s treatment of the medical 
practice, the state’s accounting title law forbids the use of any 
phrase or abbreviation likely to be confused with the title certified 
public accountant or C.P.A.24 
A review of those selected title laws reveals that some regulate 
the use of specific words, titles, and designations,25 whereas others 
prohibit the use of any words, titles, and designations where such 
use is misleading.26  Some state laws contain elements of both 
types of restriction on words, titles, and designations.27  Neverthe-
 
23. Delaware Medical Practices Act, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, §§ 1701-1703 (1997).  
The Medical Practices Act provides in part: 
(b) As used in this chapter, “practice of medicine” means to: 
. . . . 
(4) Hold oneself out in any manner as engaged in the practice of medicine 
or to use in connection with his name, the words or letters “Dr.”, “Doc-
tor”, “M.D.”, “D.O.”, “Healer” or any other title, word, letter or designa-
tion which may imply or designate one engaged in the practice of medi-
cine. 
(c) As used in this chapter, the “unauthorized practice of medicine” shall refer 
to the practice of medicine as defined in subsection (b) of this section by per-
sons not permitted to perform any of the acts set forth in said subsection. 
Id. § 1703 
24. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 121(a)-(b) (1997).  Delaware’s accounting title law 
provides, in pertinent part: 
Any person who represents himself or herself to the public as the recipient of a 
certificate or permit, or holds himself or herself out as being authorized to prac-
tice certified public accountancy or public accountancy, or otherwise wrong-
fully uses such title or any similar title to practice certified public accountancy 
or public accountancy after revocation, suspension or expiration of a certificate 
or permit or otherwise misleads the public or violates this chapter or associated 
regulations shall be fined not less than $500 nor more than $1000.  Restitution 
may also be imposed. 
Id. § 121(a).  Delaware’s real estate brokers and salespersons title law is notable as well.  
See id. tit. 24, § 2906(a) (1997).  So are Delaware’s nursing home administrator title law, 
id. tit. 24, § 5209(4), and its architecture title law.  Id. tit. 24, § 303(a). 
25. See id. tit. 24, §§ 1703(b), 2825(2), 2906(a) (1990).  Compare the Delaware 
statutes, supra, with CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 5058 (West 1990), which also regulates 
by restricting the use of specific words, titles, and designations. 
26. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24 §§ 125(a)-(b), 303(a), 1703(c), 2825(3), 5209(4). 
27. See, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 5058.  The statute provides in pertinent 
part: 
No person or partnership shall assume or use the title or designation “chartered 
accountant,” “certified accountant,” “enrolled accountant,” “registered ac-
countant,” or “licensed accountant,” or any other title or designation likely to 
be confused with “certified public accountant” or “public accountant,” or any 
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less, the differences between the individual title laws are not tre-
mendously significant.  Under each of the title laws, unlicensed 
parties are restricted from using words, titles, and designations that 
imply a legal entitlement to engage in the licensed practice.  In 
other words, both types of title laws are enforceable if the use of 
the words, titles, and designations is found to be misleading. 
A. Enforcement of Occupational Title Laws 
Because title laws are generally enforced by state boards or 
agencies rather than by individual licensees,28 it is unclear whether 
title laws provide a direct cause of action for a licensee, or whether 
this right of action is reserved for the state.  Nevertheless, an action 
against an unlicensed individual may include a title law claim 
premised on the assertion that the law provides either a private 
right of action or an action as a taxpayer.  The bases of such claims 
are identical whether brought by individuals or by the appropriate 
state boards or agencies.  All are required to demonstrate that an 
unlicensed individual has misled the public in violation of the title 
law.  Thus, a licensee as an indirect beneficiary of title protection, 
and as a taxpaying member of the public—the direct beneficiary of 
title protection—is entitled to injunctive relief for breaches of title 
regulations.29 
B. First Amendment Issues 
When asserting a claim under a title law, or a claim under the 
Lanham Act hinged upon a title law, a licensee first may be re-
quired to establish that the law does not violate the First Amend-
ment.30  In most cases, a licensee’s claim must survive scrutiny 
under commercial free-speech jurisprudence, rather than general 
 
of the abbreviations “C.A.,” “E.A.,” “R.A.,” or “L.A.,” or similar abbreviations 
likely to be confused with “C.P.A.” or “P.A.” 
Id. 
28. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24 §§ 105, 314, 315, 1710(a), 2604(6)-(12). 
29. See California Ass’n of Dispensing Opticians v. Pearle Vision Ctr., Inc., 191 
Cal. Rptr. 762 (1983) (holding that plaintiff, an organization of licensed opticians, was 
entitled to injunctive relief against unlicensed retail optician outlets who advertised and 
provided eye care services); see also DEL. CODE ANN. title 24, § 118 (granting standing to 
an “aggrieved person”). 
30. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
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free-speech jurisprudence.31  Laws restricting commercial speech, 
unlike laws suppressing political speech, must be “tailored in a 
reasonable manner to serve a substantial state interest in order to 
survive First Amendment scrutiny.”32  Consequently, such laws 
need survive intermediate level scrutiny rather than strict scru-
tiny.33 
It is now well-established that even a communication that does 
no more than propose a commercial transaction is entitled to at 
least some First Amendment protection.34  The Supreme Court, 
however, has determined that each state’s interest in regulating 
commercial transactions provides each state with “a concomitant 
interest in the expression itself.”35  In addition, the Court has found 
that commercial speech is “linked inextricably” with the commer-
cial arrangement it proposes.36 
The Supreme Court has spoken several times regarding the 
First Amendment protections to be afforded to commercial speech.  
In Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Com-
mission of New York,37 the Court held that misleading commercial 
speech does not fall within the purview of the First Amendment.38  
 
31. See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996), for a discussion 
of general and commercial free-speech jurisprudence. 
32. Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 767 (1993) (citing Board of Trustees of the 
State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989); Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. 
v. Public Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 564 (1980)). 
33. See id. 
34. See id. (citing Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer 
Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976)). 
35. Id. (citing Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 457 (1978)). 
36. Id. (quoting Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 10 n.9 (1979)). 
37. 447 U.S. 557 (1980). 
38. See id. at 563.  Central Hudson set forth the following test for determining 
whether commercial speech shall be protected: 
In commercial speech cases, then, a four-part analysis has developed.  At the 
outset, we must determine whether the expression is protected by the First 
Amendment.  For commercial speech to come within that provision, it at least 
must concern lawful activity and not be misleading.  Next, we ask whether the 
asserted governmental interest is substantial.  If both inquiries yield positive 
answers, we must determine whether the regulation directly advances the gov-
ernmental interest asserted, and whether it is not more extensive than is neces-
sary to serve that interest. 
Id. at 566. 
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Consequently, in In re R.M.J.,39 the Court held that “[m]isleading 
advertising may be prohibited entirely.”40  Moreover, in Edenfield 
v. Fane,41 the Court acknowledged past decisions that recognized 
the states’ authority to “ban commercial expression that is fraudu-
lent or deceptive without further justification.”42 
Title laws generally prohibit misleading speech by prohibiting 
unlicensed individuals from representing themselves in any man-
ner that may lead to the belief that the individual is entitled to en-
gage in the licensed practice.43  Based on the Supreme Court’s 
analyses, title laws that prohibit only the “misleading” use of 
words, titles, and designations are constitutional on their face be-
cause misleading commercial speech does not fall within the pur-
view of the First Amendment.44 
The Supreme Court has distinguished between the following 
three categories of commercial speech:  (1) inherently misleading, 
(2) actually misleading, and (3) potentially misleading.45  In Joe 
Conte Toyota, Inc. v. Louisiana Motor Vehicle Commission,46 the 
Fifth Circuit best summarized the Supreme Court jurisprudence 
that has developed in this area, noting the distinction between ad-
vertising which is “inherently” misleading and that which is “po-
tentially” misleading.47  Two firm rules can be drawn from these 
 
39. 455 U.S. 191 (1982). 
40. Id. at 203. 
41. 507 U.S. 761 (1993). 
42. See id. at 768 (citing Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563-64; In re R.M.J., 455 
U.S. 191, 203 (1982); Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 507 (1981) (plural-
ity opinion)); see also Ibanez v. Florida Dep’t of Bus. and Prof’l Regulation Bd. of Ac-
countancy, 512 U.S. 136, 142 (1994) (citing R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 203); 44 Liquormart, 
Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996) (providing a comprehensive discussion of the 
development and status of commercial free-speech jurisprudence). 
43. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, §§ 2825(2)-(3) (1996). 
44. Determining whether particular words or statements are misleading, thereby 
falling outside the protection afforded by the First Amendment, is “a question of law 
over which [the Court will] exercise de novo review.”  Peel v. Attorney Disciplinary 
Comm’n, 496 U.S. 91, 108 (1990). 
45. See id. at 111 (citing R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 203). 
46. 24 F.3d 754 (5th Cir. 1994). 
47. The Fifth Circuit stated that: 
 The Court in R.M.J. suggested that “inherently” misleading advertising may 
be banned outright, but “potentially” misleading advertising may not.  In at-
tempting to understand the distinction, we derive additional guidance from a 
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categories of commercial speech.  First, “inherently misleading” 
speech can be prohibited without justification and without actual, 
as opposed to anecdotal, evidence of deception.48  Second, “actu-
ally misleading” speech—where there is evidence that such speech 
has misled consumers—also can be prohibited in its entirety.49  
Nevertheless, the consequences of categorizing commercial speech 
as “potentially misleading” remain uncertain. 
State title laws consistently have been upheld as constitutional 
under the commercial free-speech analysis, despite the inherent 
limitations that they impose upon free speech.50  For example, in 
 
later commercial speech case, Peel v. Attorney Disciplinary Comm’n, 496 U.S. 
91 (1990). 
 Although there was no majority opinion in Peel, the opinions of several jus-
tices shed some light on the hierarchy of misleading commercial speech.  Fur-
thermore, the Court identified a third category of misleading commercial 
speech, “actually misleading.” 
 Justice Stevens, in an opinion joined by Justice Brennan, Justice Blackmun 
and Justice Kennedy, suggested that commercial speech is “actually” mislead-
ing when there is evidence of deception.  Justice Marshall agreed that a state-
ment is “actually” misleading when the record contains evidence that recipients 
of commercial speech “actually ha[ve] been misled by the statement.” 
 A statement is “inherently” misleading when, notwithstanding a lack of evi-
dence of actual deception in the record, “the particular method by which the in-
formation is imparted to consumers is inherently conducive to deception and 
coercion.”  Included is “commercial speech that is devoid of intrinsic mean-
ing.”  In her dissent, Justice O’Connor added that “inherently misleading” 
means “inherently likely to deceive the public.”  Citing R.M.J., Justice Mar-
shall noted that states may prohibit actually or inherently misleading commer-
cial speech entirely. 
 From all this we conclude that a statement is actually or inherently mislead-
ing when it deceives or is inherently likely to deceive. 
Joe Conte Toyota, 24 F.3d at 756 (citations omitted).  It should be noted that the concepts 
of “misleading,” “inherently misleading,” “potentially misleading,” and “deceptive” are 
not further defined with specificity by any Supreme Court decision.  Nonetheless, the 
chairman of the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) Robert Pitofsky has pointed out that 
the FTC, in measuring deception and unfairness, looks at the total impression of the ad-
vertisement and determines the extent, if any, to which the audience might be misled by 
it.  Robert Pitofsky, Beyond Nader:  Consumer Protection and the Regulation of Adver-
tising, 90 HARV. L. REV. 661 (1977).  The meaning of an advertisement is a matter com-
mitted to the discretion of the FTC, which is not required to sample public opinion to de-
termine the meaning.  See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Federal Trade Comm’n, 143 F.2d 29 
(7th Cir. 1944). 
48. See In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203-04. 
49. Id. 
50. See McWhorter v. Alabama ex rel Baxley, 359 So. 2d 769, 774 (Ala. 1978) (rul-
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Snell v. Engineered System & Designs, Inc.,51 the Delaware Su-
preme Court held that Delaware’s engineering title law is constitu-
tionally sound.  Primarily, courts uphold laws proscribing the use 
of misleading speech because such speech does not fall within the 
purview of the First Amendment.52  Consequently, states may ex-
ercise of their police powers freely to prohibit the use of such 
speech.53  In holding Delaware’s engineering title law constitu-
tional, the Delaware Supreme Court opined in Snell54 that these 
types of laws are constitutional because they satisfy the applicable 
Central Hudson tests for commercial speech.  According to the 
Snell court, the prohibitions (1) do not prohibit the use of speech 
protected by the First Amendment, (2) are tailored to meet a sub-
stantial governmental interest, (3) directly advance that interest, 
and (4) are not more extensive than necessary.55 
In short, under title laws, a licensee may assert an exclusive 
right to use the regulated words, titles, and designations to indicate 
that the licensee is legally entitled to engage in the licensed prac-
tice.  Thus, in pursuing a private claim against an unlicensed indi-
vidual under a title law, a licensee must address whether the indi-
vidual’s use of the regulated words, titles, and designations is 
misleading.  If the licensee can establish that the unlicensed indi-
vidual’s use of the regulated words, titles, and designations may 
lead a reasonable person to believe that the individual is entitled to 
engage in the applicable licensed practice, then such use of the 
words, titles, and designations is per se misleading and a violation 
 
ing that misleading speech does not warrant constitutional protection because “if this be a 
limitation of free speech, . . . it is not a type of limitation prohibited by the federal consti-
tution”) (quoting Smith v. California, 336 F.2d 530, 534 (9th Cir. 1964)). 
51. 669 A.2d 13 (Del. 1995). 
52. See Peel, 496 U.S. at 111; Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566. 
53. See Peel, 496 U.S. at 111; Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566. 
54. 669 A.2d at 19. 
55. Id.  In many First Amendment cases, the “overbreadth doctrine” allows a party 
to argue that a statute interferes with protected speech, even if it is constitutional as ap-
plied to the party before the court.  See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 403 U.S. 601, 612-13 
(1973).  The overbreadth doctrine, however, does not apply to commercial speech cases.  
See Board of Trustees of the State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 481 (1989).  Thus, 
a party challenging the constitutionality of a title law is prohibited from positing it 
against hypothetical scenarios that abridge the First Amendment.  If there is evidence 
that consumers “actually ha[ve] been misled,” a violator can be stopped with little effort.  
Peel, 496 U.S. at 112. 
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of the title law. 
II. THE LANHAM ACT’S RELATION TO OCCUPATIONAL TITLE LAWS 
Under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, any misrepresentation 
that is likely to deceive consumers as to the origin, description, 
quality, or approval of any good or service is actionable by “any 
person who believes that he or she is or is likely to be damaged by 
such act.”56  Section 43(a) has been described as a statutory tort in-
 
56. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(a)(1) (West 1998).  Section 43(a) states in relevant part: 
Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or any con-
tainer for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device, 
or any combination thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or mislead-
ing description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact, which— 
(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to 
the affiliation, connection, or association of such person with another per-
son, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, ser-
vices, or commercial activities by another person, or 
(B) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the nature, 
characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or another per-
son’s goods, services, or commercial activities, shall be liable in a civil 
action by any person who believes that he or she is or is likely to be dam-
aged by such act. 
Id. 
The adoption of section 43(a) represented a departure from the common law actions 
of trade disparagement and unfair competition.  Section 43(a) also eliminated the need to 
prove actual damages, at least as a prerequisite to obtaining an injunction.  Although the 
primary purpose of the Lanham Act is the protection of trademarks, its scope is much 
broader.  It includes claims, such as false advertising and false association, which are ap-
plicable to the professionals regulated by the states.  See Holiday Inns, Inc. v. Trump, 
617 F. Supp. 1443, 1466 (D.N.J. 1985) (holding that section 43(a) proscribes not only 
acts that would technically qualify as trademark infringement, but also unfair competi-
tion practices involving actual or potential deception); Tripledge Prod., Inc. v. Whitney 
Resources, Ltd., 735 F. Supp. 1154, 1160 (E.D.N.Y. 1990) (distinguishing unfair compe-
tition from trademark infringement “insofar as the former does not involve the exclusive 
right to use a particular name, symbol or device”).  Section 43(a)’s prohibition against 
unfair competition is derived from what some courts have described as a code of unfair 
business practices: 
[Section 43(a)] means that wrongful diversion of trade resulting from false de-
scription of one’s products invades that interest which an honest competitor has 
in fair business dealings . . . .  It represents, within this area, an affirmative 
code of business ethics . . . . In effect it says:  you may not conduct your busi-
ness in a way that unnecessarily or unfairly interferes with and injures that of 
another; you may not destroy the basis of genuine competition by destroying 
the buyer’s opportunity to judge fairly between rival commodities by introduc-
ing such factors as falsely descriptive trade-marks which are capable of misin-
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tended to remove false advertising and other deceitful marketing 
practices from the marketplace.  For example, a licensee may ar-
gue under section 43(a) that the use of words, titles, and designa-
tions in violation of a title law is a misleading representation which 
is deceptive and causes confusion regarding the nature, character-
istics, qualities, affiliation, connection, or association of the user’s 
services or commercial activities with those of the licensee.57  In 
addition, the licensee would assert that the deception is likely to 
damage the licensed practice or profession by diluting the inherent 
economic and professional value of the licensee’s title—forcing 
the licensee to expend monies to correct the confusion created by 
the violation of the title law.58  The licensees also can argue that 
the unlicensed individual profited unjustly from the goodwill and 
professionalism established by licensees in the state regulated 
practice.59 
 
forming as to the true qualities of the competitive products. 
Gold Seal Co. v. Weeks, 129 F. Supp. 928, 940 (D.D.C. 1955), aff’d sub nom., S.C. 
Johnson & Son, Inc. v. Gold Seal Co., 230 F.2d 832 (D.C. Cir. 1956).  Section 43(a) “has 
been characterized as a remedial statute that should be broadly construed.”  Gordon & 
Breach Science Publishers v. American Inst. of Physics, 859 F. Supp. 1521, 1532 
(S.D.N.Y. 1994) (citing PPX Enter., Inc. v. Audiofidelity, Inc., 746 F.2d 120, 125 (2d 
Cir. 1984)); see Vidal Sassoon, Inc. v. Bristol-Myers Co., 661 F.2d 272, 278 (2d Cir. 
1981); Alfred Dunhill Ltd. v. Interstate Cigar Co., 499 F.2d 232, 236 (2d Cir. 1974)).  
The purpose behind section 43(a) is “the protection of consumers and competitors from a 
myriad of misrepresentations of products and services in commerce.”  Gordon & Breach, 
859 F. Supp. at 1532 (citing Wojnarowicz v. American Family Ass’n, 745 F. Supp. 130, 
141 (S.D.N.Y. 1990)). 
57. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(a). 
58. See id. 
59. Because individual licensees may not have the financial resources to pursue 
litigation, claims may have to be initiated collectively through professional organiza-
tions.  Therefore, courts will likely be required to determine whether the Lanham Act 
protects the interests of such organizations.  In this respect, courts have already recog-
nized that professional organizations have standing under the Lanham Act.  See West 
Indian Sea Island Cotton Ass’n v. Threadtex, Inc., 761 F. Supp. 1041, 1048-50 (S.D.N.Y. 
1991) (holding that Caribbean cotton growers had standing to prohibit confusion between 
the association’s cotton and that of a lesser quality product); National Ass’n of Pharm. 
Mfrs. v. Ayerst Labs., 850 F.2d 904, 914 (2d Cir. 1988); Camel Hair & Cashmere Inst. of 
Am., Inc. v. Associated Dry Goods Corp., 799 F.2d 6, 10-11 (1st Cir. 1986) (holding that 
a nonprofit corporation formed to promote the use of camel hair and cashmere had stand-
ing to protect reputation of cashmere); Mutation Mink Breeders Ass’n v. Lou Nierenberg 
Corp., 23 F.R.D. 155, 162-63 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) (holding that a five-thousand member 
mink breeders organization had standing to prohibit garments that created the false im-
pression that they were made of mink). 
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Although claims of false advertising and false association un-
der the Lanham Act have their own legal standards, each relies on 
a determination that the use of the words, titles, and designations at 
issue is deceptive, misleading, or likely to cause confusion. 
A. False Advertising Claims 
A claim for false advertising is one which alleges “false repre-
sentations in advertising [or promotion] concerning the qualities of 
goods or services.”60  In contrast to trademark protection, the pro-
hibition in section 43(a) against false advertising protects two 
separate interests:  (1) the right of consumers to truthful commer-
cial information61 and (2) the rights of competitors to compete in a 
market that is free of untruthful information.62  As one court noted, 
“the Lanham Act is directed toward protecting the consumer as 
well as the competitor from false and deceptive advertising.”63 
 
In Camel Hair, the First Circuit held that an association has standing to sue on be-
half of its members when “(1) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their 
own right; (2) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization’s purposes; 
and (3) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested require the participation of in-
dividual members in the lawsuit.”  799 F.2d at 10 (citing Hunt v. Washington State Ap-
ple Adver. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 342-43 (1977)).  As long as an organization and its 
members are engaged in both commercial activities and the promotion of the licensed 
practice, the three prong test enunciated in Camel Hair should be satisfied. 
60. Tom Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1108 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing 2 J. 
MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION, §§ 27:2-27:4, at 344-68 (2d ed. 
1984)) [hereinafter J. MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS]; see also Fuller Bros. v. International 
Mktg., Inc., 870 F. Supp. 299, 302 (D. Or. 1994).  In comparison, under a false associa-
tion claim, a claimant alleges the making of false representations in advertisements or 
promotions concerning the origin, association, or endorsement of goods or services 
“through the wrongful use of another’s distinctive mark, name, [word, symbol,] trade 
dress or other device.”  Waits, 978 F.2d at 1108. 
61. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(a) (1998).  Commentators have stated that the prohibi-
tion in section 43(a) is “designed to protect the right of the consumer to be told the 
truth.”  2 J. MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS, supra note 60, § 27:4, at 352. 
62. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(a). 
63. U-Haul Int’l, Inc. v. Jartran, Inc., 681 F.2d 1159, 1162 (9th Cir. 1982).  The 
United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania described the pur-
pose of the Lanham Act with respect to trademark infringement as follows: 
[T]he “basic issue in a trademark infringement action under both the Lanham 
Act and the common law” is the likelihood that consumers will be misled and 
confused by the trademark infringement as to the origin or sponsorship of the 
goods or services consumed.  The Third Circuit has observed that trademark 
law “is not made for the protection of the experts but for the public—that vast 
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1. The Legal Standard 
In Johnson & Johnson-Merck Consumer Pharmaceutical Co. 
v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Pharmaceutical, Inc.,64 the Third Circuit 
summarized the standard for establishing a claim under section 
43(a) of the Lanham Act.  The court required proof by preponder-
ance of evidence of (1) false or misleading statements by the de-
fendant about his own or another’s product, (2) actual deception or 
at least a tendency to deceive a substantial portion of the intended 
audience, (3) a likelihood that the deception is material enough to 
influence purchasing decisions, (4) movement of the advertised 
goods in interstate commerce, and (5) a likelihood of injury to the 
plaintiff through declining sales, loss of good will, and similar 
damage.65  A plaintiff can satisfy elements one and two of the 
Third Circuit test by demonstrating that the challenged advertise-
ment is literally false or that the advertisement, while literally true, 
has a tendency to deceive consumers.66  Thus, the primary consid-
eration is whether the commercial conduct complained of is decep-
tive, misleading, or likely to cause confusion. 
Before a claimant can bring an action for false advertising, 
however, the claimant must show that he has standing and that the 
violating activity is covered by the Lanham Act.  For example, an 
unlicensed individual who offers services that differ from the ap-
plicable licensed practice may not be subject to false advertising 
claims brought by licensees.  Unlike a claim of false association, 
where a plaintiff need not be a competitor, courts have held that 
recovery under a false advertising claim is “confined to injury to a 
 
multitude, which includes the ignorant, the unthinking and the credulous, who, 
in making purchases, do not stop to analyze but are governed by appearances 
and general impressions.” 
Robin Woods, Inc. v. Woods, 815 F. Supp. 856 (W.D. Pa. 1992) (citations omitted) 
(quoting Dresser Indus., Inc. v. Heraeus Engelhand Vacuum, Inc., 395 F.2d 457, 462 (3d 
Cir. 1968)). 
64. 19 F.3d 125 (3d Cir. 1994). 
65. Id. at 129 (citing U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v. Blue Cross of Greater Phila., 898 F.2d 
914, 922-23 (3d Cir. 1990). 
66. See id.; accord Pebble Beach Co. v. Tour 18 I, Ltd., 942 F. Supp. 1513, 1562 
(S.D. Tex. 1996) (citing Seven-Up Co. v. Coca-Cola Co., 86 F.3d 1379, 1390 (5th Cir. 
1996); Castrol Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 987 F.2d 939, 943 (3d Cir. 1993)). 
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competitor.”67  Not surprisingly, whether one qualifies as a com-
petitor has become a substantial issue.68 
A fairly standard test for determining whether a plaintiff is a 
competitor examines “the potential for a competitive or commer-
cial injury.”69  If the plaintiff has a reasonable commercial interest 
to protect against the alleged false advertising, then he is deemed a 
competitor.70  The competitive or commercial injury test is easily 
met by showing that the violation of a title law may lead a reason-
able person to believe that the unlicensed individual is entitled to 
engage in the licensed practice.  Under this mistaken belief, a rea-
sonable person might employ the unlicensed individual, thereby 
causing the licensee to incur competitive or commercial injuries.71  
By posing as a licensed practitioner, an unlicensed individual may 
damage the licensee’s reputation and goodwill, thus diluting the 
inherent economic value of the regulated words, titles, and desig-
nations.  Such dilution would likely require corrective advertising 
to clear up the confusion created by the unlicensed individual’s 
 
67. Fuller Bros. v. International Mktg., Inc., 870 F. Supp. 299, 303 (D. Or. 1994) 
(citing Halicki v. United Artists Communications, Inc., 812 F.2d 1213, 1214 (9th Cir. 
1987)). 
68. See id. (describing the substantive issue as whether the plaintiff had “stand-
ing . . . against the maker of a product that is ‘marketed to many of the same customers’ 
as its product”). 
69. Alan Rosenfeld v. W.B. Saunders, 728 F. Supp. 236, 242 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), 
aff’d, 923 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1990) (citing Berni v. International Gourmet Restaurants of 
Am., Inc., 838 F.2d 642, 648 (2d Cir. 1988)).  The Second Circuit also noted that a plain-
tiff need not be a direct competitor to meet the standing requirement.  Id. 
70. See id. (quoting Johnson & Johnson v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 631 F.2d 186, 190 
(2d Cir. 1980)). 
71. With regard to the “relatedness” of services, in the trademark context, the Sixth 
Circuit has stated that: 
[S]ervices are “related” not because they coexist in the same broad industry, 
but are “related” if the services are marketed and consumed such that buyers 
are likely to believe that the services, similarly marked, come from the same 
source, or are somehow connected with or sponsored by a common company.  
“The question is, are the [services] related so that they are likely to be con-
nected in the mind of a prospective purchaser?” 
Homeowners Group, Inc. v. Home Mktg. Specialists, Inc., 931 F.2d 1100, 1109 (6th Cir. 
1991) (quoting Fleishmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 314 F.2d 149, 159 
(9th Cir. 1963)); see also Wynn Oil Co. v. Thomas, 839 F.2d 1183, 1187 (6th Cir. 1988) 
(stating that products and services are related when they are similar enough that consum-
ers could easily assume that they are offered by the same source). 
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violation.72 
Another hurdle for a licensee in a false advertising claim is es-
tablishing that the unlicensed individual has engaged in “commer-
cial advertising or promotion.”73  Because these terms are not de-
fined in the Lanham Act, there is substantial debate regarding what 
types of activities are actionable.74  Nevertheless, the courts agree 
that section 43(a) of the Lanham Act is “limited to false advertis-
ing as that term is generally understood.”75  False advertising, as 
understood by the courts, is not confined to a formal advertising 
campaign, but may consist of more informal promotional activi-
ties.76 
The standard for establishing that the actions of a defendant 
fall into the category of false advertising may vary based on the 
nature of the industry and the manner of conduct.77  For example, 
where the relevant purchasing public is small, the requirements 
may be satisfied by a single letter or face-to-face solicitation.78  
 
72. See I Can’t Believe It’s Yogurt v. Gunn, No. Civ. A. 94-OK-2109-TL, 1997 
WL 599391 (D. Colo. Apr. 15, 1997), 1997-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 71,879. 
73. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(a) (West 1998). 
74. See Ashley H. Draughon, Replenishing The Ink of the Poison Pen:  Restricting 
the Scope of Section 43(A) of the Lanham Act in Garland Co. v. Ecology Roof Systems 
Corp., 3 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 353 (1996), for an excellent discussion of the standards for 
“commercial advertising and promotion” as they relate to false advertising under the 
Lanham Act. 
75. Alfred Dunhill, Ltd. v. Interstate Cigar. Co., 499 F.2d 232, 236 (2d Cir. 1974). 
76. Gordon & Breach Science Publishers v. American Inst. of Physics, 859 F. Supp. 
1521, 1536 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (stating that “representations need not be made in a classic 
advertising campaign, but may consist instead of more informal types of ‘promotion’”) 
(internal quotations omitted); see also Seven-Up Co. v. Coca-Cola Co., 86 F.3d 1379, 
1384 (5th Cir. 1996) (agreeing with the Gordon & Breach characterization of the re-
quirements for establishing “commercial advertising or promotion”). 
77. See National Artists Mgmt. Co. v. Weaving, 769 F. Supp. 1224, 1235 (S.D.N.Y. 
1991) 
78. See, e.g., Mobius Mgmt. Sys. Inc. v. Fourth Dimension Software, Inc., 880 F. 
Supp. 1005, 1019-21 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (holding that a single letter from a computer soft-
ware manufacturer to a potential customer could constitute commercial advertising or 
promotion within the meaning of Lanham Act); National Artists, 769 F. Supp. at 1232-35 
(ruling that telephone conversations may constitute commercial advertising for purposes 
of a Lanham Act claim because, in the theater booking industry, services are promoted 
by word-of-mouth). 
Although advertisements need not reach a wide audience, they must reach the pur-
chasing public in order to satisfy the consumer protection policy of the Lanham Act.  See 
FASA Corp. v. Playmates Toys, Inc., 912 F. Supp. 1124, 1174 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (“Adver-
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Generally, any dissemination of advertising materials or use of the 
regulated words, titles, and designations in logos, business cards, 
badges, or other credentials is sufficient to satisfy the “advertising 
or promotion” requirement.79 
2. Literally False, Or Literally True But Misleading 
To succeed in a Lanham Act false advertising claim, a licensee 
must show that an unlicensed individual’s use of the regulated 
words, titles, and designations is literally false or, when the defen-
dant is a legal user of the words, titles, and designations, that such 
use is deceptive or misleading.80  Moreover, whether advertising or 
promotion is false on its face is a question of fact.81  Consequently, 
courts have agreed that a determination of literal falsity “rests on 
an analysis of the message in context.”82 
To demonstrate that a challenged advertisement is literally 
false, a claimant may rely on the unlicensed individual’s mislead-
ing use of words, titles, and designations commonly understood to 
represent a licensee.83  Thus, when unlicensed individuals improp-
erly use such terms as “accountant” or “engineer” or improperly 
label unlicensed businesses as “accounting” or “engineering” ser-
vices,” their unauthorized use of the words “engineer” or “ac-
countant” or their derivatives, under such circumstances, may be 
deemed literally false.  Based on such a determination of literal fal-
 
tising material that is not distributed to the general public cannot support a claim of false 
advertising.”); see also Hertz Corp. v. Avis, Inc., 725 F. Supp. 170, 171 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) 
(finding no liability for advertisement in travel agent magazine because “advertising . . . 
that fails to reach the consuming public does not come within the purview of the Lanham 
Act”), vacated on other grounds, 732 F. Supp. 26 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). 
79. See FASA Corp., 912 F. Supp. at 1171 (stating that the “Lanham Act applies to 
the likelihood of post-sale confusion of ‘prospective’ or ‘potential’ purchasers, not only 
point-of-sale purchasers”). 
80. See Saundoz Pharm. Corp. v. Richardson-Vicks, Inc., 902 F.2d 222, 227 (3d 
Cir. 1990). 
81. See L&F Prods. v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 45 F.3d 709, 712-13 (2d Cir. 1995); 
Ortho Pharm. Corp. v. Cosprophar, Inc., 32 F.3d 690, 693-94 (2d Cir. 1994). 
82. Johnson & Johnson-Merck Consumer Pharm. Co. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer 
Pharm., Inc., 19 F.3d 125, 129 (3d Cir. 1994) (citing Saundoz Pharm. Corp., 902 F.2d at 
227). 
83. See generally, Saundoz Pharm. Corp., 902 F.2d at 224 (requiring additional 
proof that a defendant’s claims are literally false or actually misleading in order to sup-
port a Lanham Act false advertising claim). 
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falsity, a court may grant the relief requested by the licensee 
“without considering whether the buying pubic was misled.”84  
That is because representations that are literally false are presumed 
to be materially misleading to consumers.85  The courts also will 
presume irreparable harm once literal falseness is established.86 
If literal falsity cannot be established, the literally true but mis-
leading use of words, titles, and designations may be actionable by 
a licensee.87  Although advertising is said to be misleading based 
on the public’s reaction to it,88 the extent to which consumers are 
deceived need not be established to support a finding that the ad-
vertising or promotion is misleading.  Rather, the licensee must 
provide a “qualitative showing [to] establish that a not insubstan-
tial number of consumers received a false or misleading impres-
sion from it.”89 
To succeed on a false advertising claim based on the mislead-
ing use of words, titles, and designations, the licensee must prove 
that the defendant’s use of the regulated words, titles, and designa-
tions would lead the average consumer to believe that the defen-
dant is legally entitled to engage in the licensed practice.90  In fact, 
an individual’s advertising or promotional activities could be mis-
leading in a number of different ways.  Most common is mislead-
ing advertising that suggests that the individual is a licensee who 
will provide services of the same quality required of licensees.  In 
other circumstances, the consuming public may associate the ser-
vices offered by the user of the words, titles, and designations with 
someone who has attained a certain academic level or satisfied the 
 
84. Johnson & Johnson, 19 F.3d at 129. 
85. See Energy Four, Inc. v. Dornier Med. Sys., Inc., 765 F. Supp. 724, 731 (N.D. 
Ga. 1991) (holding that if representations are actually false, the court does not have to 
determine whether the representations are likely to create confusion, because false claims 
are presumed to be material); McNeil-PPC, Inc. v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 755 F. 
Supp. 1206, 1211 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (holding that when advertising is false, the court may 
grant relief based on its own findings without reference to any consumer reaction to the 
advertisement), aff’d, 938 F.2d 1544 (2d Cir. 1991). 
86. See King v. Innovation Books, 976 F.2d 824, 831 (2d Cir. 1992). 
87. See Johnson & Johnson, 19 F.3d at 129. 
88. Id. 
89. McNeil-PPC, 755 F. Supp. at 1211 (quoting McNeilab, Inc. v. American Home 
Prods. Corp., 501 F. Supp. 517, 528 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)). 
90. See Johnson & Johnson, 19 F.3d at 129. 
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state requirements of a licensee.91  Either showing is sufficient to 
demonstrate a potential for consumer confusion.92 
 
91. See Kilpatrick v. State Bd. of Registration for Prof’l Eng’rs., 610 S.W.2d 867, 
871 (Tex. 1980) (“[T]he use by a company or corporation of the word ‘engineering’ in its 
name constitutes a representation or holding out to the public that the company or corpo-
ration is legally qualified to engage in the practice of engineering.”) (quoting State Bd. of 
Registration for Prof’l Eng’rs. v. Wichita Eng’g Co., 504 S.W.2d. 606, 609 (Tex. 1973)). 
92. See Joe Conte Toyota v. Louisiana Motor Vehicle Commission, 24 F.3d 754, 
757 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding that the terms “dealer invoice,” “cost,” “inventory,” and 
“invoice” were inherently misleading because they “ha[ve] no fixed, ascertainable mean-
ing to the average consumer”) (quoting Barry v. Arrow Pontiac, Inc., 494 A.2d 804 (N.J. 
1985)); see also In re Robinson, 162 B.R. 319, 324-25 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1993) (ruling that 
misuse of terms “legal assistant” and “legal technician” were misleading under Kansas 
law); Adams Ford Belton, Inc. v. Missouri Motor Vehicle Comm’n, 946 S.W.2d 199, 
202-03 (Mo. 1997) (en banc) (ruling it was within the state’s licensing power to regulate 
the price advertising of licensed automobile dealers to prevent consumers from being 
misled); Alabama Bd. of Registration for Prof’l Eng’rs & Land Surveyors, 369 So. 2d 14 
(Ala. 1979) (enjoining Asphalt Engineers, Inc., from using the term “engineers” in its 
business name); McWhorter v. Alabama Bd. of Registration for Prof’l Eng’rs & Land 
Surveyors, 359 So. 2d 769, 773-74 (Ala. 1978) (“[T]he term ‘engineer,’ as a matter of 
law, necessarily implies a professional status . . . regardless of the intent of the individ-
ual.”); Tackett v. Texas Bd. of Registration for Prof’l Eng’rs, 466 S.W.2d 332 (Tex. 
1971); Department of Registration & Educ. v. Hund, 385 N.E.2d 836 (Ill. 1979) (enjoin-
ing Classic Landscape Engineers from using the designation “engineer” in its business 
name and in advertising); cf. In re Kaitangian, Nos. 96-01692-B7, 96-06354-M7, 96-
07367-H7, 96-09272-A7, 96-08789-M7, 96-08788-A7, 96-07639-A7, 1998 WL 61179, 
at *3 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. Jan. 23, 1998) (“The use of the word ‘paralegal’ . . . creates the 
misleading impression that the [users] are qualified to give legal advice, when in reality, 
they can lawfully provide none.”); Green v. United States, No.C 97-0007, 1997 WL 
16298 (N.D. Cal. Jan 13, 1998) (holding constitutional a prohibition by 15 U.S.C. § 
110(f)(1) on use of the world “legal”); In re Hobbs, 213 B.R. 207, 215 (Bankr. D. Me. 
1997) (ruling pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 110 that misuse of term “paralegal” in advertising 
fosters consumer confusion); In re Calzadilla, 151 B.R. 622, 626 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1993) 
(forbidding typing service from advertising in a misleading fashion that would lead a rea-
sonable person to believe that it was offering legal services, advice, or assistance).  But 
cf. Miller v. Stuart, 117 F.3d 1376, 1382-83 (11th Cir. 1997) (ruling that Florida’s public 
accountancy licensure law infringed upon the commercial speech rights of a licensed 
Certified Public Accountant (“CPA”) who held himself out as a CPA while working for a 
firm not licensed in accounting); Abramson v. Gonzalez, 949 F.2d 1567, 1578 (11th Cir. 
1992) (refusing to enforce Florida law that limited use of word “psychologist” to licensed 
psychologists because Florida allowed unlicensed psychologists to practice psychology, 
hence it could not prevent them from accurately describing their occupation) (superseded 
by statute); Parker v. Kentucky Bd. of Dentistry, 818 F.2d 504, 510 (6th Cir. 1987) 
(striking down Kentucky law that barred general dentists from using words “orthodon-
tics” and “braces” in advertising because Kentucky allowed general dentists to perform 
those procedures); In re Sutfin, 693 A.2d 73, 74-76 (N.H. 1997); Comprehensive Ac-
counting Serv. Co. v. Maryland State Bd. of Public Accountancy, 397 A.2d 1019, 1026 
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Although courts disagree as to whether a survey is required to 
demonstrate the necessary likelihood of confusion or deception,93 
most commentators recommend that plaintiffs use a survey.  In any 
case, surveys are an extremely useful tool when pursuing title law 
claims.94 
 
(Md. 1979) (refusing to permit express ban on all uses of word “accountant” by unli-
censed bookkeepers because Maryland allowed unlicensed persons to perform some ac-
counting services); Kentucky Bd. of Registration for Prof’l Eng’rs & Land Surveyors v. 
Performance Eng’g, Inc., 758 S.W.2d 48 (Ky. 1988) (finding that use of the word “engi-
neering” did not violate licensing statute where there was no evidence that anyone had 
been misled into believing that professional engineering was involved); Professional 
Eng’rs In California Gov’t v. State Personnel Bd., 137 Cal. Rptr. 110 (1977) (ruling that 
individuals using the title “Resident Engineer” were not required to register under the 
licensing statute). 
93. See Tools USA & Equip. Co. v. Champ Frame Straightening Equip., Inc., 87 
F.3d 654, 661 (4th Cir. 1996) (“Actual confusion can be demonstrated by survey evi-
dence, but contrary to Champ’s suggestion, survey evidence is not necessarily the best 
evidence of actual confusion and ‘surveys are not required to prove likelihood of confu-
sion.’”) (quoting Woodsmith Publ’g Co. v. Meredith Corp., 904 F.2d 1244, 1249 (1990)); 
Johnson & Johnson, 19 F.3d at 129-30 (“[T]he success of a [Lanham Act] claim usually 
turns on the pervasiveness of a consumer survey.”); Reebok Int’l Ltd. v. K-Mart Corp., 
849 F. Supp. 252 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), vacated by settlement, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d 1863 (S.D.N.Y. 
1994).  In Reebok, the district court stated that: 
The court also looks with great skepticism on Reebok’s claim that it declined 
to conduct a survey due to a desire to avoid ‘a waste of resources.’ . . . Reebok, 
using experienced trademark counsel at trial, was well aware of the pivotal role 
that consumer surveys and other evidence of confusion play in Lanham Act 
claims. 
Id. at 275.  But see Max Daetwyler Corp. v. Input Graphics, Inc., 608 F. Supp. 1549, 
1552 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (holding that the absence of a consumer survey does not preclude 
issuing an injunction and is not required to establish actual deception in support of dam-
ages recovery). 
94. See Moore v. California State Bd. of Accountancy, 831 P.2d 798 (Cal. 1992) 
(addressing the potential concerns regarding the use of survey evidence, and concluding 
that such evidence was proper in deciding whether the words “accountant” and “account-
ing” are misleading).  The California Supreme Court stated in Moore that: 
 We do not, in this regard, mean to suggest that the response to a public opin-
ion poll is itself an appropriate basis for “deciding an issued of statutory con-
struction.”  Obviously, the Legislature did not have the results of this opinion 
poll before it upon enacting section 5058.  What must be determined is whether 
the Board could reasonably conclude that use of the unmodified terms “ac-
countant and accounting services,” as a factual matter, is misleading or poten-
tially misleading to the public’s detriment, and if so, whether the Legislature 
nonetheless intended to exclude those terms from the scope of the prohibitory 
catchall language when it enumerated a list of specifically prohibited titles 
which utilize the term “accountant” in conjunction with modifiers. 
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B. False Association Claims 
A claim for false association alleges false representations in 
advertising or promotion concerning the origin, association, or en-
dorsement of goods or services through the wrongful use of an-
other’s distinctive name, word, symbol, trade dress, or other de-
vice.95  Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act96 provides a civil action 
for claims of false association even if the “word, term, name, sym-
bol, or device” in which the interest is claimed is not federally reg-
istered.97  In order for an unregistered mark to be protectable under 
section 43(a), the mark must be capable of distinguishing the plain-
tiff’s services from those of others.98  This standard is met when 
the mark is inherently distinctive or has acquired distinctiveness 
through secondary meaning, after which “[i]nfringement is . . . es-
tablished through a showing of likelihood of confusion.”99  Simi-
larly, a licensee may argue that the words, titles, and designations 
regulated by a title law are marks used to describe his or her ser-
vices.100 
 
 The survey evidence introduced below merely informs us as to the first, fac-
tual inquiry.  By analogy, in change of venue cases, survey evidence is often 
admitted as probative of the determination whether prevailing community atti-
tudes warrant a change of venue.  Indeed, at trial respondent introduced evi-
dence of a similar poll taken in Texas in 1985.  In the Texas poll, 62 percent of 
those responding to the survey answered “yes” when asked whether people 
who advertise as “accountants” are required to be licensed by the State of 
Texas; 19 percent said “no”; and 19 percent did not know.  Michael Hagen, a 
specialist in the analysis of public opinion research data, testified that in his 
opinion the data from the Texas poll could inform the conclusions to be drawn 
from the California poll because of the similarity of responses to comparable 
questions and the similarity of certain demographic factors in each of the sur-
veys.  Based on his review and analysis of the data from the California and 
Texas polls, Hagen concluded that a majority of Californians believe persons 
who advertise as “accountants” are required to hold at least a college degree, 
take a qualifying examination, and be licensed by the state. 
Id. at 808 n.6 (citations omitted). 
95. See Tom Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc. 978 F.2d 1093, 1108 (9th Cir. 1992); Fuller 
Bros. v. International Mktg., Inc., 870 F. Supp. 299, 302 (D. Or. 1994). 
96. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(a) (West 1998). 
97. Pebble Beach Co. v. Tour 18 I, Ltd., 942 F. Supp. 1513, 1536 (S.D. Tex. 1996). 
98. See id. (citing Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 768 (1992)). 
99. Id. 
100. A licensee’s mark is more appropriately characterized as a service mark.  See 
Worthington Foods Inc. v. Kellogg Co., 732 F. Supp. 1417, 1429 (S.D. Ohio 1990) (“A 
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1. Standard of Protection:  The Trademark Analogy 
A licensee may protect a regulated word, title, or designation 
from use by non-licensees just as a trademark holder may protect 
an unregistered mark from unfair use.  First, a licensee must estab-
lish that the occupational title is entitled to protection and that the 
licensee has a protectable interest in the word, title, or designa-
tion.101 
Once the licensee’s interest in the protected title is ratified by 
the court, liability under the Lanham Act can be established by 
analogy to the Act’s trademark standards.102  Thus, the licensee 
must show that the defendant used the reproduction, counterfeit, 
copy, or colorable imitation of the word, title, or designation, with-
out the registrant’s consent, in connection with the sale, offering 
for sale, distribution, or advertising of any goods or services where 
such use was likely to cause confusion, mistake, or deception.103 
2. Protection of Words, Titles, and Designations 
Regulated By Title Laws 
Title laws provide licensees the exclusive right to use the regu-
lated words, titles, and designations in a manner consistent with 
their given purpose.  Such use by anyone other than a licensee is 
per se misleading and confusing.  Nevertheless, under a Lanham 
Act false association claim, the primary issue is whether the use of 
the words, titles, and designations by a licensee distinguishes his or 
her services from those of non-licensees.104 
A licensee bringing a Lanham Act false association claim must 
 
service mark identifies and distinguishes services of one person from services of others.  
It does not identify goods.”); Holiday Inns v. Trump, 617 F. Supp. 1143, 1464 (D.N.J. 
1985) (“The only difference between a trademark and a service mark is that the former is 
associated with the sale of goods, while the latter concerns . . . the provision of ser-
vices.”). 
101. See Pebble Beach, 942 F. Supp. at 1536. 
102. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1114 (West 1998). 
103. See Pebble Beach, 942 F. Supp. at 1536 (citing Boston Prof’l Hockey Ass’n v. 
Dallas Cap & Emblem Mfg., Inc., 510 F.2d 1004, 1009-10 (5th Cir. 1975)); see also 15 
U.S.C.A. § 1114(1)(a). 
104. See Pebble Beach, 942 F. Supp. at 1536. 
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demonstrate that his or her use of the regulated words, titles, and 
designations is “inherently distinctive” or has “acquired distinct-
iveness through secondary meaning.”105  The strength of a mark is 
judged in accordance with the classic trademark taxonomy set 
forth by Judge Friendly in Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting 
World, Inc.106  A trade or service mark may be (1) fanciful, (2) ar-
bitrary, (3) suggestive, (4) descriptive, or (5) generic.107  Fanciful, 
arbitrary, or suggestive marks are inherently distinctive and pro-
tectable without a showing of secondary meaning.108  Descriptive 
marks are protectable only on a showing of secondary meaning, 
while generic marks are never protectable.109 
a. Suggestive & Descriptive Terms 
Regulated words, titles, and designations are suggestive when 
used in a commercial context to identify a licensee or licensed 
practice.  Such use of the regulated words, titles, and designations 
suggests that the user is a licensee who will provide the skills ex-
pected of a licensee.  Upon a showing that the word, title, or desig-
nation in question is suggestive, it is protectable without a showing 
of secondary meaning.110 
 
105. Id.  In Pebble Beach, the court stated that: 
The Lanham Act does not require a party to ‘own’ a word, symbol, or other 
identifying mark before it may be granted protection from infringement.  
Rather, all that is required is that a party use the mark in commerce to identify 
its services and distinguish them from the services of others. 
Id. at 1541 (internal quotations omitted) (citing 15 U.S.C.A. § 1127 (West 1998)); see 
also Boston Prof’l Hockey, 510 F.2d at 1014 (noting that under trademark law, a party 
acquires the right to a mark through the public’s association of that mark with the user). 
106. 537 F.2d 4(2d Cir. 1976). 
107. Id. at 9, cited in Pebble Beach, 942 F. Supp. at 1537. 
108. See Sicilia Di R. Biebow & Co. v. Cox., 732 F.2d 417, 425 n.3 (5th Cir. 1984), 
cited in Pebble Beach, 942 F. Supp. at 1537. Fanciful marks are those which are com-
prised of words that do not exist in every day language.  See Pebble Beach, 942 F. Supp. 
at 1537 n.19.  “Xerox’ is a fanciful mark.”  Id.  Arbitrary marks consist of words that, 
while part of every day language, are arbitrarily applied to a particular good, such as 
“Blue Bell” as applied to ice cream.  Id.  Suggestive marks suggest some characteristic of 
the good to which it is attached.  See id.  An example of a suggestive term is “Penguin” 
for food freezers.  Id. 
109. “Aspirin” is an example of a generic mark, while “Chap Stick” is an example 
of a descriptive mark because it describes the use of lip balm.  Id. at 1537 n.20. 
110. See Holiday Inns, Inc. v. Trump, 617 F. Supp. 1443, 1464 (D.N.J. 1985) (cit-
ing Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339, 1364 (D.N.J. 1981)). 
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Regulated words, titles, and designations also are said to be de-
scriptive when used in a commercial context to identify a profes-
sion.  A reference to an individual by means of a regulated word, 
title, or designation is, in fact, a description of that person’s profes-
sional role.  When the regulated words, titles, and designations are 
descriptive, they are protected only if they have acquired a secon-
dary meaning. 
b. Secondary Meaning 
A descriptive word, title, or designation acquires a secondary 
meaning when the consuming public recognizes the mark, not only 
as identifying a service, but also as a symbol indicating that the 
service emerges from a single source.111  In determining whether a 
mark has attained a secondary meaning, it is necessary to consider 
(1) the length and manner of the plaintiff’s use of the mark, (2) the 
nature and extent of advertising of the mark by the plaintiff, (3) the 
plaintiff’s efforts to promote in the minds of consumers a con-
scious connection between the mark and a particular product or 
service, and (4) the defendant’s intent behind copying the mark.112  
To establish secondary meaning, a licensee must show that the 
consuming public thinks that persons who employ regulated occu-
pational titles are qualified and licensed under state law. 
Many licensed practices and corresponding state title laws have 
long histories, marked by significant effort and financial expendi-
ture to develop the reputation of the licensed practice.113  Evidence 
of such efforts may be useful in demonstrating that the regulated 
words, titles, and designations, when used in a commercial-
professional context, have acquired secondary meaning.114 
 
111. See id. at 1465 (quoting Estate of Presley, 513 F. Supp. at 1364). 
112. See Pebble Beach, 942 F. Supp. at 1539; see also Shen Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Sun-
crest Mills, Inc., 673 F. Supp. 1199, 1204 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (finding that a plaintiff may 
establish secondary meaning with a wide variety of evidence, including advertising ex-
penditures, consumer surveys, commercial success, and the extent of media coverage). 
113. See Zatarains Inc. v. Oak Grove Smokehouse, Inc., 698 F.2d 786, 795 (5th Cir. 
1983) (stating that proof of considerable advertising efforts and the expenditure of money 
toward developing goodwill can help establish secondary meaning). 
114. See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. McNeil-P.P.C., Inc., 786 F. Supp. 182, 194 
(E.D.N.Y. 1992) (stating that a word or phrase acquires secondary meaning “when it has 
been used so long and so exclusively by one producer . . . [that] the word or phrase has 
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3. Standing to Assert Claims 
Before successfully presenting a false association claim, a li-
censee must satisfy the standing requirements.  Standing can be es-
tablished by demonstrating an ownership interest in the regulated 
words, titles, and designations.  A licensee’s standing also may rest 
on an implied right of action through the grant of rights from the 
state to the license holder. 
The states, which possess the authority to control the use of oc-
cupational titles, act as licensors—granting licensees exclusive 
privileges to use regulated words, titles, and designations in a 
manner that communicates the users’ entitlement to engage in the 
 
come to mean that the article was the first producer’s”) (quoting G. Heileman Brewing 
Co. v. Anheuser-Busch Inc., 676 F. Supp. 1436, 1467 (E.D. Wis. 1987), aff’d, 873 F.2d 
985 (7th Cir. 1989)), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 973 F.2d. 1033 (2d Cir. 1992); Holi-
day Inns, 617 F. Supp. at 1465; National Football League Properties, Inc. v. Wichita 
Falls Sportswear, Inc., 532 F. Supp. 651, 659 (W.D. Wash. 1982) (holding that the basic 
element of secondary meaning is the recognition in buyers’ minds that products con-
nected with the word or symbol emanate from or are associated with the same source). 
A defendant will, in all likelihood, argue that the regulated words, titles, and desig-
nations are generic and therefore not entitled to protection.  Such an assertion may be 
rebutted by reference to a dictionary definition of the word “engineer:” 
[A] designer or builder of engines . . . a person who is trained in or follows as a 
profession a branch of engineering . . . a person who carries through an enter-
prise by skillful or artful contrivance . . . a person who runs or supervises an 
engine or an apparatus 
[T]o lay out, construct, or manage as an engineer 
MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 383 (10th ed. 1996).  The word “engi-
neer” also has been defined in the following manner:  “to plan, construct, or manage as 
an engineer . . . to plan and direct skillfully; superintend; guide.”  WEBSTER’S NEW 
WORLD DICTIONARY 450 (3d College ed. 1991). Although the word “engineer” has many 
meanings, a licensed engineer can argue that when the word is used to describe a profes-
sion, it clearly has a distinct meaning, which is “a person skilled or occupied in some 
branch of engineering.”  Id.  If, however, a defendant establishes that the regulated 
words, titles, and designations are generic, the analysis ends because the Lanham Act 
does not protect generic terms for purposes of a false association claim.  A defendant’s 
victory on this issue, nevertheless, does not preclude liability under claims arising from 
false advertising, title law, or deceptive trade practice, which are based on the misleading 
use of the regulated words, titles, and designations.  Along these lines, in Moore v. Cali-
fornia State Board of Accountancy, the court found the use of the arguably generic terms 
“accountant” or “accounting” by an unlicensed person to be misleading.  831 P.2d 798, 
813 (Cal. 1992).  Accordingly, the court barred an unlicensed person’s use of the name 
“Accounting Services,” unless the name was qualified by an explanation or disclaimer.  
Id. at 800.  The court concluded that “the unqualified use of those terms [is] misleading, 
to the public’s detriment.”  Id. at 813. 
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licensed practice.  Because the right, granted by the state is a li-
cense, it reasonably follows that a licensee has standing to enforce 
any infringement, just as a franchise licensee can bring an action to 
prohibit false advertising, false association, or other Lanham Act 
claims against an infringing party.115  Short of actual standing, the 
implied right of action is a prerequisite for the establishment of a 
false association claim by a licensee against an infringing party. 
4. Testing for Likelihood of Confusion 
The Third Circuit has endorsed a ten factor test to be used to 
determine the existence of a likelihood of confusion.116  Those fac-
tors examine the history and use of marks in relation to products, 
as well as similarities in the marketing and use of products.  The 
test is easily adaptable to the protection of words, titles, and desig-
 
115. See Business Trends Analysts v. Freedonia Group Inc., 650 F. Supp. 1452, 
1457 (S.D.N.Y 1987) (ruling that a consulting company with the exclusive right to pro-
duce, publish, and distribute certain industry studies under another’s trademark had 
standing to sue for trademark infringement).  In Business Trends, the court stated: 
[T]he absence of the trademark’s “owner” in the instant case does not prevent a 
plaintiff with a concrete interest in protecting the mark from bringing suit.  Be-
cause BTA has the exclusive right to distribute [certain] industry studies and to 
produce and publish new studies under that trademark, it also has standing to 
sue for trademark infringement. 
Id. at 1458 (footnote omitted); see also Frisch’s Restaurants, Inc. v. Elby’s Big Boy of 
Steubenville, Inc., 670 F.2d 642, 649-50 (6th Cir. 1982) (stating that an exclusive licen-
see of the “Big Boy” trademark and service mark had standing to bring a trademark in-
fringement action). 
116. See Scott Paper Co. v. Scott’s Liquid Gold, Inc., 589 F.2d 1225, 1229 (3d Cir. 
1978); see also Robin Woods, Inc. v. Woods, 815 F. Supp. 856, 871 (W.D. Pa. 1992) 
(citing Scott Paper).  The ten factors in the Third Circuit test are: 
(1) the degree of similarity between the owner’s mark and the  alleged infring-
ing mark; (2) the strength of owner’s mark; (3) the price of the goods and other 
factors indicative of the care and attention expected of consumers when mak-
ing a purchase; (4) the length of time the defendant has used the mark without 
evidence of actual confusion arising; (5) the intent of the  defendant in adopt-
ing the mark; (6) the evidence of actual confusion; (7) whether the goods, 
though not competing, are marketed through the same channels  of trade and 
advertised through the same media; (8) the extent to which the targets of the 
parties’ sales efforts are the same; (9) the relationship of the  goods in the 
minds of the public because of the similarity of function; (10) other facts sug-
gesting that the consuming public might expect the prior owner to manufacture 
a product in the defendant’s market. 
Scott Paper, 589 F.2d at 1229. 
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nations.  Before applying this test, however, several points must be 
noted.  First, even though proof of intent to confuse or mislead will 
lead to a presumption of confusion,117 intent is not an element of a 
Lanham Act claim.118  Second, the consumer confusion prong of 
the Third Circuit test is satisfied by evidence of only one instance 
of confusion.119  Third, evidence that a similar mark has caused ac-
tual confusion is neither conclusive nor required to establish a like-
lihood of confusion, but it is “the best evidence of a likelihood of 
confusion.”120  Finally, plaintiffs are not required to prove every 
factor of the Third Circuit test to establish liability.121 
A plaintiff also may argue that an unlicensed individual’s mis-
leading conduct that provides the basis for a false advertising claim 
also is likely to show confusion for purposes of a false association 
claim.122  Once the court determines that an individual has created 
a likelihood of confusion, irreparable injury is presumed.123  As 
with a claim for false advertising, a survey should be conducted to 
 
117. See Homeowners Group, Inc. v. Home Mktg. Specialists, Inc., 931 F.2d 1100, 
1111 (6th Cir. 1991); Holiday Inns, Inc. v. 800 Reservation, Inc., 838 F. Supp. 1247, 
1254 (E.D. Tenn. 1993), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 86 F.3d 619 (6th Cir. 1996). 
118. See U-Haul Int’l, Inc. v. Jartran, Inc., 522 F. Supp. 1238, 1254 (D. Ariz. 1981), 
aff’d, 681 F.2d 1159 (9th Cir. 1982). 
119. See Life Indus. Corp. v. Ocean Bio-Chem, Inc., 827 F. Supp. 926, 932 
(E.D.N.Y. 1993) (citing Warner Bros., Inc. v. Gay Toys, Inc., 658 F.2d 76, 79 (2d Cir. 
1981)). 
120. Pebble Beach Co. v. Tour 18 I, Ltd., 942 F. Supp. 1513, 1547 (S.D. Tex. 1996) 
(citing Amstar Corp. v. Domino’s Pizza, Inc., 615 F.2d 252, 263 (5th Cir. 1980)); see 
also Fuji Photo Film Co., Inc. v. Shinohara Shoji Kabushiki Kaisha, 754 F.2d 591, 597 
(5th Cir. 1985) (stating that “‘while very little proof of actual confusion would be neces-
sary to prove the likelihood of confusion, an almost overwhelming amount of proof 
would be necessary to refute such proof’”) (quoting World Carpets, Inc. v. Dick Littrells’ 
New World Carpets, 438 F.2d 482, 489 (5th Cir. 1971)). 
121. See Armco, Inc. v. Armco Burglar Alarm Co., 693 F.2d 1155, 1159 (5th Cir. 
1982). 
122. Courts have consistently applied an expansive interpretation to likelihood of 
confusion.  See Fuji Photo, 754 F.2d at 596 (“‘[L]ikelihood of confusion’ may be found 
absent confusion as to source; trademark infringement occurs also ‘when the use sought 
to be enjoined is likely to confuse purchasers with respect to . . . [the products’] en-
dorsement by the plaintiff, or its connection with the plaintiff.’”) (quoting Kentucky 
Fried Chicken Corp. v. Diversified Packaging Corp., 549 F.2d 368, 388 (5th Cir. 1977)); 
see also Nike, Inc. v. “Just Did It” Enters., 6 F.3d 1225, 1228 (7th Cir. 1993); Jordache 
Enters. v. Levi Strauss & Co., 841 F. Supp. 506, 515 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). 
123. See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Revlon, Inc., 577 F. Supp. 477, 482 (S.D.N.Y 1983). 
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establish a likelihood of confusion.124 
C. Remedies for Title Law Infringement 
The Lanham Act provides various remedies to trademark hold-
ers whose marks are damaged by an infringing party.  They in-
clude injunctive relief, an award of profits, damages, costs and at-
torney fees, and the destruction of the infringing articles.125 
1. Injunctive Relief 
In an action against a violator of a title law, the first type of re-
lief a licensee should seek is a preliminary injunction, followed by 
a permanent injunction, prohibiting the violator from further use of 
the regulated words, titles, and designations.  The case law distin-
guishes between the showing required to obtain an injunction and 
that required to establish a right to damages.126  Evidence that a de-
fendant’s activities are merely misleading or likely to cause confu-
sion is sufficient to warrant injunctive relief, but a plaintiff must 
show actual harm in order to recover damages.127 
 
124. See Thomas P. Olson, What The Judge Will Say:  A Litigator’s Guide To Con-
sumer Surveys In Lanham Act Cases, 1996 A.B.A. SEC. ANTITRUST L. 21 (warning that 
claims which are unsupported by survey evidence are likely to be met with skepticism in 
court). 
125. Section 34 of the Lanham Act provides for injunctive relief.  15 U.S.C.A. § 
1116 (West 1998).  Section 35 of the Lanham Act provides for all other damages.  Id. § 
1117. 
126. See Black Hills Jewelry Mfg. Co. v. Gold Rush, Inc., 633 F.2d 746, 753 (8th 
Cir. 1980); Quabaug Rubber Co. v. Fabiano Shoe Co., 567 F.2d 154, 160-61 (1st Cir. 
1977). 
127. See Camel Hair & Cashmere Inst. of Am., Inc. v. Associated Dry Goods 
Corp., 799 F.2d 6, 12 (1st Cir. 1986).  In general, to obtain a preliminary injunction, the 
party requesting the injunction must establish the following four factors:  (1) that there 
exists a reasonable probability of success on the merits, (2) that irreparable injury will 
occur if the injunction is not granted (3) that if the injunction is not granted, the harm to 
the requesting party is greater than the harm, if any, to the opposing party, and (4) that 
the public interest will not be adversely affected if the injunction is granted.  See Sandoz 
Pharm. Corp. v. Richardson-Vicks, Inc., 735 F. Supp. 597, 600 (D. Del. 1989), aff’d, 902 
F.2d 222 (3d Cir. 1990) (citing Eli Lilly & Co. v. Premo Pharm. Lab., Inc., 630 F.2d 120, 
136 (3d Cir. 1980)). 
A licensee who is unable to establish damages may still argue that the potential for 
or threat of such damages warrants an injunction against the defendant.  See Advance 
Stores Co. v. Refinishing Specialities, Inc. 948 F. Supp 643, 655 n.11 (W.D. Ky. 1996) 
(citing Frisch’s Restaurants, Inc. v. Elby’s Big Boy of Steubenville, Inc. 670 F.2d 642, 
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2. Damages 
In addition to injunctive relief, an occupational licensee may 
seek the following damages:  (1) disgorgement of profits related to 
unjust enrichment, (2) compensation for dilution of the value of the 
regulated words, titles, and designations in the marketplace, (3) 
compensation for harm to the reputation and goodwill of the licen-
see, (4) the cost of corrective advertising to clear the public’s con-
fusion, and (5) attorney fees and costs.128  The damages provisions 
of the Lanham Act are very broad, empowering courts to award up 
to three times the amount of a plaintiff’s actual damages.129 
 
647 (6th Cir. 1982)). 
128. See Burndy Corp. v. Teledyne Indus., 748 F.2d 767 (2d Cir. 1984); American 
Farm Bureau Fed’n v. Alabama Farmers Fed’n, 935 F. Supp. 1533 (M.D. Ala. 1996), 
aff’d, 121 F.3d 723 (11th Cir. 1997); Cuisinarts, Inc. v. Robot-Coupe Int’l Corp., 580 F. 
Supp. 634 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). 
129. The damages provision of the Lanham Act states in part: 
When a violation of any right of the registrant of a mark registered in the Pat-
ent and Trademark Office, or a violation under section 1125(a) of this title, 
shall have been established in any civil action arising under this chapter, the 
plaintiff shall be entitled, subject to the provisions of sections 1111 and 1114 of 
this title, and subject to the principles of equity, to recover (1) defendant’s 
profits, (2) any damages sustained by the plaintiff, and (3) the costs of the ac-
tion.  The court shall assess such profits and damages or cause the same to be 
assessed under its direction.  In assessing profits the plaintiff shall be required 
to prove defendant’s sales only; defendant must prove all elements of cost or 
deduction claimed.  In assessing damages the court may enter judgment, ac-
cording to the circumstances of the case, for any sum above the amount found 
as actual damages, not exceeding three times such amount.  If the court shall 
find that the amount of the recovery based on profits is either inadequate or ex-
cessive the court may in its discretion enter judgment for such sum as the court 
shall find to be just, according to the circumstances of the case.  Such sum in 
either of the above circumstances shall constitute compensation and not a pen-
alty.  The court in exceptional cases may award reasonable attorney fees to the 
prevailing party. 
15 U.S.C.A. § 1117.  Treble damages are allowed for use of a counterfeit mark: 
[T]he court shall, unless the court finds extenuating circumstances, enter judg-
ment for three times such profits or damages, whichever is greater, together 
with a reasonable attorney’s fee, in the case of any violation of section 
1114(1)(a) of this title or section 380 of Title 36 that consists of intentionally 
using a mark or designation, knowing such mark or designation is a counterfeit 
mark (as defined in section 1116(d) of this title), in connection with the sale, 
offering for sale, or distribution of goods or services. 
Id. 
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a. Disgorgement of Profits 
A licensee faces a significant burden when asserting a claim to 
the profits derived from a defendant’s improper and unauthorized 
use of regulated words, titles, and designations.130  Section 35 of 
the Lanham Act requires a plaintiff to prove that the defendant’s 
profits derived from sales only, without a showing of intent.131  But 
many courts do not appear to follow the law.  Even though intent is 
not an element of a Lanham Act claim,132 those courts will not 
grant an accounting to recover profits based on a theory of unjust 
enrichment unless the plaintiff establishes that the defendant will-
fully or deliberately infringed upon the plaintiff’s use of a word, 
title, or designation.133 
The cases requiring intent appear to be in direct conflict with 
section 35 of the Lanham Act, which requires proof of intent only 
 
130. See W.E. Bossett Co. v. Revlon, Inc., 435 F.2d 656, 664 (2d Cir. 1970). 
131. See 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a).  The Seventh Circuit has accepted the following 
analysis: 
The Lanham Act specifically provides for the awarding of profits in the discre-
tion of the judge subject only to principles of equity.  As stated by this Court, 
“The trial court’s primary function is to make violations of the Lanham Act 
unprofitable to the infringing party.”  Other than general equitable considera-
tions, there is no express requirement that the parties be in direct competition 
or that the infringer willfully infringe the trade dress to justify an award of 
profits.  Profits are awarded under different rationales including unjust enrich-
ment, deterrence, and compensation. 
Sands, Taylor & Wood Co., v. Quaker Oats Co., 978 F.2d 947, 961 (7th Cir. 1992) (quot-
ing Roulo v Russ Berrie & Co., 886 F.2d 931, 941 (7th Cir. 1989)); see Dorr-Oliver Inc. 
v. Fluid-Quip, Inc., 834 F. Supp. 1008, 1013-14 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (citing Sands, Taylor & 
Wood). 
It also is important to note that a defendant who attempts to reduce a plaintiff’s 
award of profits must demonstrate that a portion of those profits is unrelated to the viola-
tion.  15 U.S.C.A. § 1117(a). 
132. See Johnson & Johnson v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 631 F.2d 186, 189 (2d Cir. 
1980). 
133. See Banff, Ltd. v. Colberts, Inc., 996 F.2d 33, 35 (2d Cir. 1993); Microsoft 
Corp. v. CMOS Techs., Inc., 872 F. Supp. 1329, 1337 (D.N.J. 1994).  In Microsoft, the 
court based its holding on an interpretation of Natural Footwear Ltd. v. Hart, Schaffner 
& Marx, 760 F.2d 1383 (3d Cir. 1985), in which the Third Circuit held that “the propri-
ety of an accounting depends upon whether [the infringer’s] use was in good faith and 
whether it was palming off.”  Id. at 1407.  Although Natural Footwear did not explicitly 
hold that bad faith or intent is required for an accounting pursuant to 15 U.S.C.A. § 
1117(a), the holding arguably allows consideration of intent. 
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for a mandatory trebling of damages.134  The conflicting opinions 
have created much uncertainty as to the probability of success on a 
claim for profits. 
Absent intent, a claim for unjust enrichment is based on the 
improper use of the regulated words, titles, or designations.  A li-
censee may support such a claim by establishing that the defendant 
has unjustly profited by using an occupational title or designation 
to associate his or her services or products with the heightened de-
gree of sophistication, professionalism, quality, or approval ex-
pected of a licensee.  In such cases, licensees seek the profits that 
result from defendants’ misappropriation of the regulated words, 
titles, and designations. 
b. Recovery for Dilution of Occupational Titles 
The Lanham Act makes recovery available for the loss of value 
in a mark due to false advertising.  Dilution is among the factors 
that can be used to calculate the mark’s depreciation.135  Although 
dilution claims originally arose from state law, the Lanham Act has 
provided a federal cause of action for dilution since 1996.136 
 
134. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1117(b). 
135. See Smith Corona Corp. v. Pelikan, Inc., 784 F. Supp. 452, 475-76 (M.D. 
Tenn. 1992), aff’d, 1 F.3d 1252 (Fed. Cir. 1993); see also Homeowners Group, Inc. v. 
Home Mktg. Specialists, Inc., 931 F.2d 1100, 1105 (6th Cir. 1991) (stating that a claim 
of dilution does not require proof of confusion); Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Com-
bined Shows, Inc. v. Celozzi-Ettelson Chevrolet, Inc., 855 F.2d 480, 482 (7th Cir. 1988) 
(stating that a claim of dilution does not require competition between parties or proof of 
confusion). 
136. See Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995 (“Dilution Act”), Pub. L. No. 
104-98, 109 Stat. 985 (effective Jan. 16, 1996) (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1051, 1125, 
1127, 1341 (West 1998), 26 U.S.C.A. § 401 (West 1998), 47 U.S.C.A. § 309 (West 
1998)). 
Trademark dilution is statutorily defined as “the lessening of the capacity of a fa-
mous mark to identify and distinguish goods or services, regardless of the presence or 
absence of . . . (1) competition between the owner of a famous mark and other parties, or 
(2) likelihood of confusion, mistake, or deception.”  15 U.S.C.A. § 1127. 
As amended by the Dilution Act, section 43(c) of the Lanham Act allows dilution 
claims only for “famous” marks.  15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(c).  Section 43(c) states that: 
The owner of a famous mark shall be entitled, subject to the principles of eq-
uity and upon such terms as the court deems reasonable, to an injunction 
against another person’s commercial use in commerce of a mark or trade name, 
if such use begins after the mark has become famous and causes dilution of the 
distinctive quality of the mark, and to obtain such other relief as is provided in 
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Dilution claims are based on the blurring, tarnishment, and di-
minishment of a mark.137  The blurring of a mark involves a reduc-
tion in distinctiveness caused by the use of an exact or similar 
mark on a dissimilar product or service.138  Tarnishment occurs 
when a junior mark degrades the distinctive quality of a senior 
mark by associating it with undesirable or unsavory products or 
services.139  A “whittling” effect, or diminishment, transpires 
whenever the challenged use “drain[s] off any of the potency of the 
mark.”140 
A dilution claim regarding the illegal use of a regulated word, 
title, or designation would rely on a prospective analysis of the 
continued use by the violator.  A licensee should attempt to show 
that the violator’s continued use of the word, title, or designation 
will result in (1) a loss in distinctiveness, namely, blurring; (2) a 
 
this subsection. 
Id. § 1125(c)(1). 
The House report on the Dilution Act states that the statute’s purpose is “to protect 
famous marks where the subsequent, unauthorized commercial use of such marks by oth-
ers dilutes the distinctiveness of the mark . . . . Thus, for example, the use of DUPONT 
shoes, BUICK aspirin, and KODAK pianos would be actionable under this legislation.”  
H.R. REP. NO. 104-374, at 3 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1031.  The 
House Report further states that section 43(c) was created “to protect famous marks from 
unauthorized users that attempt to trade upon the goodwill and established renown of 
such marks and, thereby, dilute their distinctive quality.”  Id. 
137. See Deere & Co. v. MTD Prods., Inc., 41 F.3d 39, 42-45 (2d Cir. 1994). 
138. See, e.g., Jaguar Cars Ltd. v. Skandrani, 771 F. Supp. 1178 (S.D. Fla. 1991) 
(finding likelihood of dilution between Jaguar cologne and Jaguar automotive products); 
McDonald’s Corp. v. McBagel’s, Inc., 649 F. Supp. 1268 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (finding that 
“McBagel’s” blurs “McDonald’s” marks); Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. Canarsie Kiddie Shop, 
Inc., 559 F. Supp. 1189 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) (finding “Kids ‘R’ Us” likely to blur identifica-
tion of “Toys ‘R’ Us”); Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc., 875 
F.2d 1026 (2d Cir. 1989) (finding that the “LEXIS” computer research system is not di-
luted by “Lexus” automobiles). 
139. See Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publications, 28 F.3d 769 (8th Cir. 
1994) (finding use of “Michelob Oily” as tarnishment); Chemical Corp. of Am. v. An-
heuser-Busch, Inc., 306 F.2d 433 (5th Cir. 1962) (finding that use of the bug spray slo-
gan, “Where there is life . . . there’s bugs,” tarnished the beer slogan, “Where there is 
life . . . there’s Bud”); Eastman Kodak Co. v. Rakow, 739 F. Supp. 116 (W.D.N.Y. 1989) 
(prohibiting use of “Kodak” by vulgar comedian).  But see Pillsbury Co. v. Milky Way 
Prods., Inc., 215 U.S.P.Q. 124 (N.D. Ga. 1981) (ruling that a pornographic depiction of 
Poppin Fresh Doughboy is not a “tarnishment of trade characters”).  Disparagement oc-
curs when a mark is altered in a way that mocks or denigrates it.  See Deere, 41 F.3d at 
39 (prohibiting the unflattering use of the Deere logo in comparative advertising). 
140. Shadow Box, Inc. v. Drecq, 336 N.Y.S.2d 801, 802 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1972). 
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loss in the quality associated with goods or services provided by 
licensees, namely, tarnishment, if the violator’s goods or services 
are inferior in quality to those associated with the licensed prac-
tice; and (3) the loss of economic and professional value, namely, 
diminishment.141 
c. Harm to Reputation 
Closely related to the right to prohibit dilution by tarnishment 
or disparagement, a licensee also is entitled to preserve the reputa-
tion and goodwill that licensed practice enjoys in the market-
place.142  Thus, a licensee has the right to preserve the high quality 
 
141. To prevail on a claim under section 43(c), a licensee must demonstrate that (1) 
the regulated words, titles, and designations qualify as “famous marks,” (2) the defen-
dant’s violative conduct constitutes a “commercial use in commerce,” (3) the defendant’s 
conduct began after the regulated words, titles, and designations acquired their “famous” 
status, and (4) the defendant’s conduct has diluted the distinctive quality of the regulated 
words, titles, and designations.  15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(c)(1).  The most difficult hurdle for 
a licensee is the requirement to establish that regulated words, titles, and designations are 
famous marks.  The following factors are used to determine whether a mark is distinctive 
and famous: 
(A) the degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness of the mark; 
(B) the duration and extent of use of the mark in connection with the goods  or 
services with which the mark is used; 
(C) the duration and extent of advertising and publicity of the mark; 
(D) the geographical extent of the trading area in which the mark is used; 
(E) the channels of trade for the goods or services with which the mark is used; 
(F) the degree of recognition of the mark in the trading areas and channels of 
trade used by the marks’ owner and the person against whom the injunction is 
sought; 
(G) the nature and extent of use of the same or similar marks by third parties; 
and 
(H) whether the mark was registered under the Act of March 3, 1881, or the 
Act of February 20, 1905, or on the principal register. 
Id.  In the unlikely event that a licensee succeeds in satisfying the “famous marks” re-
quirement, that licensee’s claim should prevail because the remaining qualifying factors 
of section 43(c) are easily fulfilled. 
Congress expressly exempted three types of conduct from the Dilution Act:  “Fair 
use of a famous mark by another person in comparative commercial advertising or pro-
motion . . . [n]oncommercial use of a mark . . .news reporting and news commentary.”  
Id. § 1125(c)(4). 
142. See James Burrough, Ltd. v. Sign of the Beefeater, Inc., 540 F.2d 266, 274-76 
(7th Cir. 1976) (ruling that the holder of a mark has the “right” to maintain control of its 
reputation regardless of the source of confusion); see also Camel Hair & Cashmere Inst. 
of Am., Inc. v. Associated Dry Goods Corp., 799 F.2d 6, 12 (1st Cir. 1986) (ruling that 
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of service, skill, and expertise associated with the commercial use 
of the regulated words, titles, and designations, and may pursue an 
action against a violator whose use damages the licensee’s good-
will and reputation.143 
d. Corrective Advertising 
A plaintiff may be entitled to money damages in an amount 
reasonably equivalent to the cost of conducting a corrective adver-
tising campaign.144  Such a campaign might be necessary to correct 
any confusion created by the violator and to preserve or restore the 
licensee’s reputation.  The costs associated with a licensee’s cor-
rective advertising campaign can be quite substantial. 
e. Attorney Fees and Costs 
The Lanham Act authorizes awards of attorneys’ fees and costs 
in “exceptional cases.”145  To receive “exceptional case” treatment, 
the infringing acts must be “characterized as malicious, fraudulent, 
deliberate, or willful.”146  Nonetheless, in cases where a licensee is 
unable to meet this standard, attorneys’ fees may be recovered if 
the case is filed or amended as a class action by professional or-
ganizations on behalf of their licensee members.147  In such a case, 
an award of fees and costs is permitted if an injunction is ob-
tained.148 
 
the plaintiffs’ position as manufacturers and vendors of cashmere fabrics provided them 
with a strong interest in preserving cashmere’s reputation); Atlanta Gas Light Co. v. 
Semaphore Adver., Inc., 747 F. Supp. 715, 722-23 (S.D. Ga. 1990) (ruling that the Lan-
ham Act provides protection against damage to goodwill). 
143. The potential danger associated with the violation of a title law should not be 
overlooked, particularly in areas such as medicine and engineering. 
144. See Big O Tire Dealers, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 561 F.2d 1365, 
1374 (10th Cir. 1977); see also Alpo Petfoods, Inc. v. Ralston Purina Co., 997 F.2d 949, 
952 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (ruling that the cost of an advertising campaign, initiated in re-
sponse to a competitor’s false claims, was recoverable, regardless of whether the adver-
tising was undertaken expressly to rebut any false claim). 
145. Dorr-Oliver Inc. v. Fluid-Quip, Inc., 894 F. Supp. 1190, 1205 (E.D. Ill. 1995). 
146. Id. (citations omitted). 
147. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23 (permitting an award of fees and costs in cases where 
the named plaintiff confers a benefit on the class). 
148. See id. 
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f. Treble Damages 
Section 35 of the Lanham Act provides courts with the discre-
tion to treble the amount of damages.149  Under section 35, if “in-
tent” is established, there is a presumption that the damages should 
be trebled, absent “extenuating circumstances.”150 
In short, a licensee may seek redress through many distinct 
claims for damages.  Moreover, the requisite standards accompa-
nying these damages claims resemble those under claims for 
trademark infringement. 
III. DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES AS BASES FOR OCCUPATIONAL 
TITLE CLAIMS 
Licensees also may bring claims under state laws governing 
deceptive trade practices.151  Deceptive trade practices statutes pre-
vent consumer deception by providing injunctive relief against per-
sons who, in the course of business, vocation, or occupation, pass 
off goods or services as those of another or cause confusion re-
garding the source of sponsorship, approval, or certification of 
goods or services.152 
 
149. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1117(a) (West 1998). 
150. Id. § 1117(b). 
151. Virtually all of the states have substantially similar deceptive trade practice 
acts.  See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2532 (1993); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325D.44 
(West 1995). 
152. For example, according to the liability provisions of Delaware’s Deceptive 
Trade Practices Act: 
(a) A person engages in a deceptive trade practice when, in the course of his 
business, vocation, or occupation, he: 
(1)  Passes off goods or services as those of another; 
(2) Causes likelihood of confusion or of misunderstanding as to the 
source, sponsorship, approval, or certification of goods or services; 
(3) Causes likelihood of confusion or of misunderstanding as to affiliation, 
connection, or association with, or certification by, another; 
. . . . 
(5) Represents that goods or services have sponsorship, approval, charac-
teristics, ingredients, uses, benefits, or quantities that they do not have, or 
that a person has a sponsorship, approval, status, affiliation, or connection 
that he does not have; 
. . . . 
(7) Represents that goods or services are of a particular standard, quality, 
or grade, or that goods are of a particular style or model, if they are of an-
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In general, under deceptive trade practice acts, a plaintiff and 
defendant need not be in competition; actual confusion or misun-
derstanding need not be shown; and proof of monetary damage, 
loss of profits, or intent to deceive is not required.153  All that must 
be shown is a likelihood of damage resulting from the deceptive 
trade practice of another.  For example, in Grand Ventures, Inc. v. 
Whaley,154 the Delaware Supreme Court made clear that the state’s 
deceptive trade practices statute155 is “not intended to redress 
wrongs between a business and its customers,” but rather is aimed 
 
other; 
. . . . 
(12) Engages in any other conduct which similarly creates a likelihood of 
confusion or of misunderstanding. 
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2532.  The Minnesota Deceptive Trade Practices statute con-
tains similar prohibitions: 
A person engages in a deceptive trade practice when, in the  course of business, 
vocation, or occupation, the person: 
(1) passes off goods or services as those of another; 
(2) causes likelihood of confusion or of misunderstanding as to the source, 
sponsorship, approval, or certification of goods or services; 
(3) causes likelihood of confusion or of misunderstanding as to affiliation, 
connection, or association with, or certification by, another; 
(4) uses deceptive representations or designations of geographic origin in  
connection with goods or services; 
(5) represents that goods or services have sponsorship, approval,  charac-
teristics, ingredients, uses, benefits, or quantities that they do not have or 
that a person has a sponsorship, approval, status, affiliation, or  connection 
that the person does not have; 
. . . . 
(7) represents that goods or services are of a particular standard, quality, 
or grade, or that goods are of a particular style or model, if they are of  
another; 
(8) disparages the goods, services, or business of another by false or  mis-
leading representation of fact; 
. . . . 
(13) engages in any other conduct which similarly creates a likelihood of  
confusion or of misunderstanding. 
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325D.44. 
153. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2532(b) (“In order to prevail in an action 
under this chapter, a complainant need not prove competition between the parties or ac-
tual confusion or misunderstanding.”); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325D.44 (“In order to prevail 
in an action under sections 325D.43 to 325D.48, a complainant need not prove competi-
tion between the parties or actual confusion or misunderstanding.”). 
154. 632 A.2d 63 (Del. 1993). 
155. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2532. 
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at unfair interference with the horizontal relationships between 
businesses.156 
Recovering damages under some deceptive trade practice acts, 
such as the Delaware statute, requires that a foundation for actual 
damages be derived from another state statute or from the common 
law.157  For example, the Delaware Trademark Act provides a 
cause of action for injury, or a likelihood of injury, to business 
reputation and for the dilution of both registered and unregistered 
trade or service mark,158 providing a plaintiff with the right to seek 
profits and other damages.  Furthermore, most states have dilution 
statutes, which make a deceptive trade practice claim viable for 
most licensees.159 
IV. DEFENSES TO TITLE LAW INFRINGEMENT CLAIMS:  STRENGTHS 
& WEAKNESSES 
A defendant facing a occupational title infringement action can 
assert a variety of defenses—regardless of whether the action is 
based on a title law, the Lanham Act, or a state deceptive trade 
practices act.  Typically, a defendant will justify the use of the 
regulated words, titles, and designations on the basis of trademark 
registration and preemption, or as constitutionally-protected com-
mercial free-speech.  Not all are truly viable defenses. 
A. The Defenses of Trademark Registration and Preemption 
A defendant may assert trademark registration as a defense to 
an action for unauthorized use of occupational titles or designa-
tions.  In such cases, a licensee may discover that an unlicensed 
individual has registered his own particular use of the regulated 
words, titles, or designations as his trademark.160  If the defendant 
 
156. Grand Ventures, Inc. v. Whaley, 632 A.2d 63, 70 (Del. 1993).  The court 
stated that “[t]he Act is intended to address unfair or deceptive trade practices that inter-
fere with the promotion and conduct of another’s business.”  Id. at 65. 
157. See DEL. CODE ANN. title 6, § 2533. 
158. See id. title 6, § 3313. 
159. See, e.g., N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 368-d (McKinney 1996); CAL. BUS. & PROF. 
CODE § 14330 (West 1987); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 35-11i(c) (West 1997); GA. CODE 
ANN. § 10-1-451(b) (1994); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 495.151 (West 1997). 
160. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1051 (West, WESTLAW through Pub. L. No. 105-158, 
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has used the mark in connection with his specified services for five 
continuous years after the registration date and files an appropriate 
affidavit, the mark should be deemed “incontestable.”161  Never-
theless, trademark registration may not be a viable defense in a ti-
tle infringement action because even a registered trademark may 
be deemed deceptive.162  Moreover, it is irrelevant that the words, 
titles, and designations contained in the license laws are not them-
selves registered marks, because section 43 and the damages pro-
visions of the Lanham Act apply with equal force to registered and 
unregistered marks.163 
Similarly unpersuasive is the defense of federal preemption.  A 
violator is unlikely to be successful by asserting the defense that 
federal trademark law preempts any claims arising under state title 
laws or state deceptive trade practices acts.  If a violator’s use of 
regulated words, titles, or designations is found to be misleading, 
such use may be prohibited regardless of any federal trademark 
registration.164 
 
Feb. 13, 1998) (allowing the owner of a mark used in commerce to register his or her 
trademark on the principal register established for trademark registration); see also id. § 
1053 (allowing the owner of a service used in commerce to register it in the same manner 
as a trademark). 
161. See id. § 1065 (providing incontestability for a mark after five years of regis-
tration, continuous use, and timely filing of the appropriate affidavits of use). 
During the five year period before a mark achieves incontestability, an action can be 
filed with the Trademark Trial and Appeals Board requesting that the registration be can-
celed because it is misleading or misdescriptive.  This type of action may be pursued si-
multaneously with the other actions recommended to prevent or cure occupational title 
infringements.  Nevertheless, cancellation of the unlicensed individual’s trademark does 
not prevent the individual from using the regulated words, titles, and designations.  Con-
sequently, this approach probably would not be very effective for a licensee. 
162. See, e.g., Thompson Med. Co. v. Federal Trade Comm’n, 791 F.2d 189 (D.C. 
Cir. 1986) (finding that the trademark “Aspercreme” was deceptive because the product 
did not contain aspirin). 
163. See Pebble Beach Co. v. Tour 18 I, Ltd., 942 F. Supp. 1513, 1536 (S.D. Tex. 
1996); Resorts Int’l, Inc. v. Greate Bay Hotel & Casino, Inc., 830 F. Supp. 826, 839 
(D.N.J. 1992). 
164. See Barnett v. Maryland State Bd. of Dental Examiners, 444 A.2d 1013, 1020-
22 (Md. 1982) (stating that a dentist’s registration of the term “polodontics” as a service 
mark under the Lanham Act, did not preempt the State Board of Dental Examiners from 
exercising their state authority to ban the use of the term in misleading or deceptive ad-
vertisements); see also Storer Cable Communications v. City of Montgomery, 806 F. 
Supp. 1518 (M.D. Ala. 1992) (holding that federal trademark law preempts state trade-
mark law when the state law would allow the use of misleading trademarks, thereby in-
REED.TYP 9/29/2006  4:47 PM 
1997] CLAIMS UNDER PROFESSIONAL LICENSURE LAWS 263 
B. The Defenses of Trademark Abandonment, Laches, and 
Statute of Limitations 
Trademark abandonment and laches are affirmative defenses 
on which the defendant bears the burden of proof.165  The Lanham 
Act provides that a mark is deemed abandoned when its use has 
been discontinued with an intent not to resume use or when the 
owner’s acts or omissions cause the mark to become the generic 
name for the goods or services it represents.166  A licensee who de-
lays pursuing an occupational title action may be found to have 
abandoned the regulated words, titles, and designations.167  If 
abandonment occurs, and unlicensed individuals thoroughly dilute 
the regulated words, titles, and designations, other licensees might 
face great difficulty prohibiting future title law violations. 
Under the laches defense, a defendant may avoid liability by 
successfully arguing that the plaintiff was aware of the matter 
complained of, failed to take action in a reasonable period of time, 
and that the defendant will now be prejudiced because of actions 
taken in reliance on the plaintiff’s acquiescence.  A violator’s use 
of regulated words, titles, or designations—even for years—does 
not, by itself, constitute laches.  The laches defense requires that 
the defendant establish that (1) the plaintiff has inexcusably de-
layed enforcement of the occupational title law, (2) the defendant 
is now prejudiced by the delay, and (3) the defendant has exhibited 
good faith.168 
 
fringing on the federal guarantee of exclusive use).  Preemption applies only to the rela-
tionship between the federal and state governments.  Thus, federal trademark registration 
would not preempt a federal Lanham Act claim. 
165. See Exxon Corp. v. Humble Exploration Co., 695 F.2d 96, 99 (5th Cir. 1983). 
166. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1127 (West 1998). 
167. See Stephen King v. Innovation Books, 976 F.2d 824, 832 (stating that the 
party asserting laches must establish the plaintiff’s unreasonable lack of diligence and the 
resulting prejudice). 
168. Saratoga Vichy Spring Co. v. Lehman, 625  F.2d 1037, 1040 (2d Cir. 1980) 
(quoting Cuban Cigar Brands, N.V. v. Upmann  Int’l, Inc., 457 F. Supp. 1090, 1096 
(S.D.N.Y. 1978)), aff’d without op., 607 F.2d 995 (2d Cir. 1979). 
A defendant’s ongoing title law violation is likely to cause him difficulty in estab-
lishing his own good faith.  See West Indian Sea Island Cotton Ass’n, Inc. V. Threadtex, 
Inc., 761 F. Supp. 1041, 1051 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (ruling that “mere knowledge and delay 
do not constitute laches”).  Moreover, a finding of laches alone “ordinarily will not bar a 
plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief, although it typically will foreclose a demand for 
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A laches defense gains potency from the amount of money and 
other resources that a title law violator invests in advertising and 
promotion to develop goodwill for his use of prohibited words, ti-
tles, or designations.169  Accordingly, a licensee must put a violator 
on notice as soon as possible so that the violator acts at his own 
peril if he continues investing to promote the prohibited word, title, 
or designation.170 
A violator also may invoke a statute of limitations defense.  
Wherever a federal statute does not contain a specific time bar on 
claims, as is the case with the Lanham Act, a court looks to the 
“most appropriate” or the most “analogous” statute of limitations 
in the law of the forum state.171 
A statute of limitations has little application in title law cases 
where the violations are ongoing.  In such cases, the statute of 
limitations could be asserted only to bar a portion of damages. 
C. The Commercial Free-Speech Defense 
A defendant may assert that his use of a protected word, title, 
or designation is protected commercial speech under the First 
Amendment.  Although misleading commercial speech may be en-
tirely prohibited without violating the First Amendment, the Su-
preme Court has ruled that “the States may not place an absolute 
 
an accounting or damages.”  Conan Properties, Inc. v. Conan’s Pizza, Inc., 752 F.2d 145, 
152 (5th Cir. 1985). 
169. See MDT Corp. v. New York Stock Exch., Inc., 858 F. Supp 1028, 1033 (C.D. 
Cal. 1994) (holding that the central purpose of the laches doctrine in Lanham Act cases is 
to discourage the plaintiff from delaying suit until the defendant’s use of the mark has 
acquired its own secondary meaning). 
170. Cf. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. McNeil-P.P.C., Inc., 786 F. Supp. 182, 217 
(E.D.N.Y. 1992) (holding that even though a delay in challenging a trademark infringe-
ment may not rise to the level of laches, it may nonetheless indicate absence of irrepara-
ble harm for purposes of preliminary injunction). 
171. See Gordon & Breach Science Publishers v. American Inst. of Physics, 859 F. 
Supp. 1521, 1528 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (citing Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 268 (1985); 
Holmberg v. Ambrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 395 (1946)).  The court must select “that limita-
tions period which best reflects the federal policy at issue.”  Id. (citing Construction 
Tech., Inc. v. Lockformer Co., 704 F. Supp. 1212, 1219 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); PepsiCo., Inc. 
v. Dunlop Tire & Rubber Corp., 578 F. Supp. 196, 199 (S.D.N.Y. 1984)).  Courts ad-
dressing this issue have applied the forum state’s statute of limitation for fraud to Lan-
ham Act cases.  See Construction Tech., at 1229. 
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prohibition on certain types of potentially misleading informa-
tion . . . if the information also may be presented in a way that is 
not deceptive.”172  The standard of review, however, is unclear. 
When dealing with potentially misleading speech, the Court 
has articulated the following standard of review:  “Although the 
potential for deception and confusion is particularly strong in the 
context of advertising professional services, restrictions upon such 
advertising may be no broader than reasonably necessary to pre-
vent the deception.”173  Nevertheless, state courts complain that the 
Supreme Court has failed to explicitly define the term “inherently 
misleading” in regard to commercial speech.174  Nor has the Court 
defined the concept of “potentially misleading” commercial 
speech.  The Fifth Circuit supplied its own interpretation of the 
 
172. In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982).  In R.M.J., the Court suggested that 
“the remedy in the first instance is not necessarily prohibition but preferably a require-
ment of disclaimers or explanation.”  Id. (citing Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 
350, 375 (1977).  Thus, in Peel v. Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Commission of 
Illinois, the Supreme Court concluded that an attorney had a First Amendment right to 
place on his letterhead the notation, “Certified Civil Trial Specialist by the National 
Board of Trial Advocacy.”  496 U.S. 91, 109 (1990).  The Court held that: 
To the extent that potentially misleading statements of private certification or 
specialization could confuse consumers, a State might consider screening certi-
fying organizations or requiring a disclaimer about the certifying organization 
or the standards of a specialty.  A State may not, however, completely ban 
statements that are not actually or inherently misleading, such as certification 
as a specialist by bona fide organizations . . . . 
Id. at 110 (citation omitted).  Similarly, in Ibanez v. Florida Department of Business & 
Professional Regulation, the Supreme Court held that an attorney had a First Amendment 
right to place on her letterhead the notations “C.P.A.” (“Certified Public Accountant”) 
and “C.F.P.” (“Certified Financial Planner”).  512 U.S. 136 (1994); see also Iowa Sup. 
Ct. Bd. of Prof. Ethics & Conduct v. Wherry, 569 N.W.2d 822 (Iowa 1997) (upholding 
state’s authority to impose special eligibility requirements on lawyers who wish to adver-
tise specific fields of practice). 
It is important to note the negative implication of the Court’s refusal to allow prohi-
bitions against certain types of misleading information, such as a listing of areas of prac-
tice.  The holding implies that states may place absolute prohibitions on certain other 
types of potentially misleading information.  Although not expressly stated by the Su-
preme Court, one may logically conclude, based on the Court’s decision in Peel, that the 
issue of whether particular words or statements are “potentially misleading” is a question 
of law to be decided by the courts.  See Peel, 496 U.S. at 108. 
173. R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 203. 
174. See, e.g., Snell v. Engineered Sys. & Designs, Inc. 669 A.2d 13, 19 n.9. (Del. 
1995) (“The United States Supreme Court has not defined with any specificity the con-
cept of ‘inherently misleading’ commercial speech.”). 
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phrase “inherently misleading,” holding that terms might be inher-
ently misleading when they are “amorphous” and “misleading to 
the public” and lack a “fixed, ascertainable meaning to the average 
consumer.”175 
If a court determines that a defendant’s use of the regulated 
words, titles, and designations is merely “potentially mislead-
ing,”176 and if the defendant voluntarily chooses to use a dis-
claimer on its documentation, such as, “not authorized to engage in 
the practice of [  ],” the defendant may succeed in arguing that 
such use is permissible because the disclaimer eliminates the po-
tential consumer confusion.177  Of course, this strategy also will 
fail upon a finding that the defendant’s use is inherently mislead-
ing. 
The use of a disclaimer is a stronger defense to a title law claim 
than it is to a Lanham Act claim.  In the Lanham Act context, dis-
claimers that emphasize the source of a product or services or that 
disclaim affiliation may reduce or eliminate the likelihood of con-
fusion.178  Nevertheless, the mere presence of a disclaimer does not 
necessarily prevent consumer confusion.  For example, the use of 
an obscure or inconspicuous disclaimer obviously will not suffi-
ciently reduce consumer confusion.179  Some courts place the bur-
den on the defendant to provide evidence establishing that the dis-
claimer is effective.180  In any case, a licensee may require an 
 
175. Joe Conte Toyota, Inc. v. Louisiana Motor Vehicle Comm’n, 24 F.3d 754, 757 
(5th Cir. 1994) (quoting Barry v. Arrow Pontiac, Inc., 494 A.2d 804 (N.J. 1985)). 
176. See supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text.  (discussing the standards gov-
erning the term “potentially misleading”). 
177. See A & H Sportswear Co. v. Victoria’s Secret Stores, Inc., 967 F. Supp. 1457 
(E.D. Pa. 1997). 
178. See August Storck K.G. v. Nabisco, Inc., 59 F.3d 616, 618-19 (7th Cir. 1995); 
Soltex Polymer Corp. v. Fortex Indus., Inc., 832 F.2d 1325, 1330 (2d Cir. 1987). 
179. See Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publications, 28 F.3d 769, 774 (8th Cir. 
1994) (stating that an obscure disclaimer was insufficient to quell the confusion gener-
ated by a parody of a trademark in a humor magazine); University of Georgia Athletic 
Assoc. v. Laite, 756 F.2d 1535, 1547 (11th Cir. 1985) (holding that the disclaimer placed 
on the novelty beer can, which stated that the novelty beer was not associated with the 
plaintiff’s mark, was insufficient to remedy the confusion). 
180. See Charles of the Ritz Group, Ltd. v. Quality King Distribs., Inc., 832 F.2d 
1317, 1324 (2d Cir. 1987); Home Box Office, Inc. v. Showtime/The Movie Channel, 
Inc., 832 F.2d 1311, 1315 (2d. Cir. 1987). 
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effective disclaimer as part of a negotiated settlement. 
CONCLUSION 
With the ever-expanding avenues for advertising and promo-
tion, such as the Internet, and with the creation of many new voca-
tions spawned from emerging technologies, the potential for title 
law abuses will increase.  For example, in the computer technology 
area, many individuals who do not hold engineering degrees and 
are not licensed to practice engineering have begun to identify 
themselves as engineers, using company-specific certifications 
such as “netware engineer” or “systems engineer.”  If licensed en-
gineers do not take action to prohibit such conduct, and if licensees 
in other professions do not act to prohibit similar conduct, the pro-
tections of the title laws could be lost forever. 
Nonetheless, licensees have yet to avail themselves of the 
many means of redress provided by the Lanham Act and deceptive 
trade practice acts.  Instead, there is a misplaced reliance on en-
forcement by the states.  But licensees can no longer merely report 
title law violations to state boards and agencies; licensees must be-
come active in enforcing their rights and privileges to adequately 
preserve their individual interests and those of their profession.  
Licensees also must encourage their state boards to closely moni-
tor title law violations. 
Some licensees and state boards are concerned about potential 
accusations that title law enforcement is merely economic territori-
alism.  They must not forget, however, that the principle purpose 
of professional regulation is protection of the public from the ob-
vious potential for physical and economic harm presented by the 
rendering of services by those who are not competent.  That pro-
tection—through title law enforcement—is a public, as well as a 
private obligation. 
